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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Income Tax and National Insurance (NI) emerged and evolved separately as very 
different systems with very different functions. Over time, however, they have 
gradually converged. Insofar as Income Tax and NI are now very similar to each 
other, there are at least two large potential gains to be had from amalgamating them: 
transparency and administrative efficiency. There is a widespread consensus outside 
government that such a merger would be desirable in principle. However, successive 
governments have viewed the idea as too problematic to pursue, arguing that the 
remaining differences between Income Tax and NI are substantial and desirable, and 
that retaining these differences in a merged framework would be so complicated as to 
nullify the benefits of integration. 
Given the potential benefits of integration, whether the remaining differences between 
Income Tax and NI do indeed constitute a prohibitive barrier to integration is an 
important question for public policy. The aim of this project is to address that 
question and provide a comprehensive analysis of full integration, setting out the 
major hurdles and considering how they might be overcome. We aim to examine the 
relationship between Income Tax and NI, taking a broader perspective than reducing 
employer compliance costs within the current system, and draw together analysis of 
the big issues – the contributory principle, the taxation of savings and pensions, the 
levying of employer contributions, the taxation of the self-employed – which are 
frequently discussed disparately and out of context, and combine them with analysis 
of detailed differences in, for example, the definition of earnings between the two 
systems. We ignore tax credits and corporation tax: such links as they have with 
Income Tax are largely irrelevant to the issues associated with Income Tax-NI 
integration. 
We begin by outlining the current systems of Income Tax and National Insurance, 
describing how they converge, how they remain different and what others have said 
about integration. In Section III we outline what is at stake: the potential gains from 
integration. Section IV then examines each of the differences between Income Tax 
and NI in turn – the ‘contributory principle’, the levying of an employer charge, 
various differences in the tax base, and procedural differences. Section V concludes. 
This paper is an interim report, published for discussion: its conclusions are not final 
and comments are welcome. In the final report we hope to: 
•  Consider the role of the contributory system in more depth 
•  Bring more empirical evidence to bear on the theoretical arguments presented 
here 
•  Address the difficulties that arise in an international context more closely 
•  Give more attention to the difficulties associated with transition 
•  Make recommendations for reform. 
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II.   BACKGROUND AND THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
A.  DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM IN 2007–08 
1.  Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax  
Approximately 31.6 million individuals pay Income Tax in the UK, but not all income 
is subject to tax. The primary forms of taxable income are earnings from employment, 
income from self-employment and non-incorporated businesses, jobseeker’s 
allowance, retirement pensions, income from property, bank and building society 
interest and dividends on shares. Income tax is not paid on employer or employee 
pension contributions (up to a limit), certain means-tested benefits (eg, Child Benefit), 
or on income from certain savings products, such as National Savings Certificates and 
Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs). Income tax is the largest source of government 
revenue, forecast to raise £154.1 billion in 2007–08.
1
(a) Rate Structure and Allowances 
Income Tax is levied in increasing marginal rates on an individual’s total annual 
income in excess of a personal allowance. The basic personal allowance is £5,225. 
People aged 65 and over have higher allowances: the personal allowance for 
taxpayers aged 65 to 74 is £7,550; for those aged 75 and over the allowance is £7,690.  
In the past, married couples were also entitled to a married couple’s allowance 
(MCA). This was abolished in April 2000, except for those already aged 65 or over at 
that date (i.e. born before April 1935). For these remaining claimants, the MCA no 
longer acts to increase the personal allowance; instead, it simply reduces final tax 
liability by £628.50 (£636.50 for those aged 75 or over). Couples may choose which 
of them claims the MCA, or they can claim half each. 
 
If income for those aged 65 or over exceeds £20,900 then first the higher personal 
allowance and then (where appropriate) the MCA are gradually reduced. The personal 
allowance is reduced by 50 pence for every pound of income above the £20,900 
threshold, gradually reducing it to a minimum level equal to the allowance for the 
under-65s for those with incomes above £25,550 (£25,830 for those aged 75 or over). 
Above this latter threshold, those entitled to MCA have it reduced by five pence for 
every additional pound of income until it reaches a minimum level of £244.00 for 
those with incomes above £33,240 (£33,680 for those aged 75 or over). 
 
Income above the personal allowance is taxed at the starting rate (10%) on the first 
£2,230, at the basic rate (22%) on the next £32,370, and at the higher rate of 40% on 
the remaining excess over £34,600. Savings income (other than dividends) is as 
above, except that income falling within the basic rate band is taxed at 20% (the lower 
rate). Dividend income is taxed at 10% up to the basic-rate limit and 32.5% above 
that. However, this is offset by a dividend tax credit, which reduces the effective rates 
to 0% and 25% respectively.  This means that, for basic-rate taxpayers, company 
profits paid out as dividends are taxed once (via corporation tax on the company 
profits) rather than twice (via both corporation tax and Income Tax). When 
                                                 
1 Source: Table C8 of HM Treasury (2007a). 
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calculating which tax band different income sources fall into, dividend income is 
treated as the top slice of income, followed by savings income, followed by other 
income. 
It was not until 1965 that a tax on gains from the disposal of capital assets was 
introduced in the UK. Capital gains (actual or deemed proceeds of disposal less 
acquisition cost) above an annual exemption of £9,200 are in effect treated as the top 
slice of income and taxed as if they were savings income. However, gains may be 
reduced by taper relief, which in the case of business assets held for at least two years 
is 75% of the gain otherwise taxable. This results in an effective tax rate on business 
assets for higher-rate taxpayers of only 10%. Non-business assets receive less 
generous taper relief. Assets acquired before 1998 may also be eligible for indexation 
allowance, which increases their cost base in line with inflation as measured by the 
Retail Prices Index. The yield from capital gains tax is comparatively small; it is 
forecast to bring in £4.8 billion in 2007-08.
2
In the 2007 Budget the Government announced it will abolish the starting rate for 
non-savings income from April 2008, cut the basic rate to 20% from April 2008, and 
raise the effective higher rate threshold (i.e. the basic rate limit that applies to taxable 
income plus the basic personal allowance) to £43,000 in April 2009. The Government 
also proposed substantial and controversial changes to the taxation of capital gains in 
the October 2007 Pre Budget Report. From April 2008, taper relief and indexation 
allowance are to be abolished, and a single capital gains tax rate of 18% applied above 
the annual exemption. 
(b) Filing and Payment 
Most Income Tax is deducted at source: by employers through the Pay-As-You-Earn 
(PAYE) system, or by banks etc. for any interest payments. The PAYE system is 
cumulative: when calculating tax due each week or month, the employer considers 
income not simply for the period in question but for the whole of the tax year to date. 
Tax due on total cumulative income is calculated and tax paid thus far is deducted, 
giving a figure for tax due this week or month. For those with stable incomes, this 
system will be little different from a non-cumulative system (in which only income in 
the current period is considered). For those with volatile incomes, however, the 
cumulative system means that, at the end of the tax year, the correct amount of tax 
should have been deducted, whereas under a non-cumulative system, an end-of-year 
adjustment might be necessary. To enable employers to deduct the right amount of 
tax, HM Revenue and Customs supplies them with a ‘tax code’ for each employee, 
which describes the allowances to which the employee is entitled. If individual 
circumstances change (starting to receive a pension, for example), the Revenue issues 
a new tax code for that individual. Income tax deducted from employees’ wages is 
remitted to HMRC each month; smaller businesses can pass on the tax quarterly. At 
the end of the tax year, the employer must make a return to HMRC (a P14 form for 
each employee and a P35 form covering all employees) summarising payments to 
employees and deductions made from the payments. The employer also must provide 
this information to each employee on form P60. 
                                                 
2 Source: Table C8 of HM Treasury (2007a). 
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The sophistication of the cumulative PAYE systems means that most taxpayers do not 
need to file year-end Income Tax returns. Those with more complicated affairs, 
however, such as the self-employed, those with very high incomes, company directors 
and landlords, must fill in a self-assessment tax return, setting down their incomes 
from different sources and any tax-privileged spending such as pension contributions 
or gifts to charity. Taxpayers may send their returns to HM Revenue and Customs 
before 30 September each year, and HM Revenue and Customs will calculate the tax 
owed, given the information on income sources provided by the taxpayer. 
Alternatively, for those wishing to calculate their own tax bill, the deadline is the 
following 31 January, which is also the deadline for payment of the balance of tax not 
deducted at source.  For taxpayers who do not have tax deducted at source (such as 
the self-employed), Income Tax is collected  in half-yearly instalments during the tax 
year based on the taxpayer’s prior year’s income, with a final payment based on 
actual income required by the 31 January tax return filing deadline. 
 
2.  National Insurance 
National Insurance contributions (NICs) act like a tax on earnings, but their payment 
entitles individuals to certain (‘contributory’) social security benefits. 
Some contributions (22 per cent of the total in 2005–06) are allocated to the National 
Health Service (NHS); the remainder are paid into the NI Fund and used to finance 
contributory benefits. The NI Fund is not a true fund in the sense that it has no 
significant balance available for investment: current contributions finance current 
benefits, with the fund merely being a device to prevent cash-flow problems. NICs are 
forecast to raise £96.5 billion in 2007-08, second only to Income Tax as a source of 
government revenues.
3
There are six categories (‘classes’) of NICs. The type and amount of NICs levied 
primarily depends upon whether the taxpayer is employed or self-employed, and on 
the amount of earnings. Where a taxpayer is both an employee and self-employed, he 
or she may have to pay more than one class of contribution, subject to an annual 
maximum.
4 Individuals aged under 16 or above state pension age are exempt from 
NICs (and may not pay voluntary (Class 3) NICs), except that employer contributions 
(Class 1 (secondary), Class 1A and Class 1B NICs) are payable in respect of 
employees above state pension age. NICs are not deductible from income for Income 
Tax purposes. 
(a) NICs for Employees 
By far the most important category of NICs is Class 1. Employees pay primary Class 
1 NICs of 11% on the excess of their earnings over the Primary Threshold (PT) of 
£100 per week, up to the Upper Earnings Limit (UEL) of £670 per week, and a further 
1% on earnings above the UEL. Employees with earnings over the Lower Earnings 
Threshold (LEL) of £87 per week qualify for contributory benefits even though no 
                                                 
3 Source: Table C8 of HM Treasury (2007a). 
4 The procedure for calculating the annual maximum is described in some detail at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/nim01163.htm 
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contributions are actually paid until the PT is reached. If the employee ‘contracts out’ 
of the State Second Pension the primary Class 1 rate is reduced by 1.6%.
5 A special 
married woman’s reduced rate of 4.85% is available on earnings between the PT and 
UEL in exchange for lower benefit entitlement, but since May 1977 this option has 
been available only to married women paying it almost continuously since that date, 
which is now a very small number. 
In addition, employers pay secondary Class 1 NICs at a rate of 12.8% on an 
employee’s earnings in excess of the Secondary Threshold (ST) of £100, but with no 
upper limit. Where the employee has contracted out of the State Second Pension, the 
secondary Class 1 rate on earnings between the LEL and UEL is reduced by either 
3.7% (if the employee is enrolled in a salary-related employer pension scheme) or 
1.4% (a money purchase scheme). Since employer contributions bear no relation to 
benefits provided under the NI scheme, these contributions are in effect simply a 
payroll tax. Class 1 contributions (primary and secondary) are collected through the 
PAYE system and account for the vast majority of total NIC receipts. 
Some forms of employee benefits in kind (broadly, those that can be sold or traded) 
are treated as earnings for both employer and employee NICs calculations. Others are 
not subject to employee NICs, but are subject to 12.8% ‘Class 1A’ employer 
contributions. Employers also pay Class 1B NICs of 12.8% on PAYE settlement 
agreements (arrangements negotiated between employers and HMRC whereby 
employers agree to pay tax on earnings or benefits which would otherwise fall to be 
paid by their employees). Like secondary Class 1 contributions, Class 1A and 1B 
contributions have no upper limit and do not give rise to any additional benefit 
entitlements for the employee. 
Like Income Tax, NICs are deducted from employees’ wages and are paid to HMRC 
quarterly or monthly. Unlike Income Tax, however, NICs for employees are assessed 
separately in each pay period (usually a week or a month), irrespective of earnings in 
the rest of the year. The employer must make a year-end NIC return to HMRC (also 
on forms P14 and P35) and individual reports to its employees (on form P60). 
(b) NICs for the self-employed 
Self-employed persons over 16 years of age and under the pensionable age pay Class 
2 contributions at a flat rate of £2.20 per week (subject to a small earnings exception 
of £4,635) and Class 4 contributions of 8% of their annual profits between the lower 
profits limit (LPL) of £5,225 and upper profits limit (UPL) of £34,840, plus a further 
1% on profits above the UPL. 
A self-employed individual’s Class 2 contribution record determines his or her 
entitlement for basic state pension, bereavement, maternity, and incapacity benefits. 
Most self-employed earners are not entitled to other benefits available to employed 
earners making Class 1 contributions, notably contribution-based jobseeker’s 
                                                 
5 If the employee is contracted out into a money purchase pension scheme, the government pays 
additional age-related rebates into the pension fund to reflect the fact that a larger private pension 
contribution is needed at later ages to yield the same pension income as would be yielded by the State 
Second Pension if the employee were contracted in. 
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allowance and the State Second Pension.
6 Class 4 contributions give rise to no 
additional benefit entitlement.  
(c) Voluntary NICs 
Finally, individuals can make voluntary Class 3 contributions of £7.80 per week to 
maintain a contribution record in respect of certain long-term benefits (basic state 
pension and bereavement benefits). In practice very few individuals choose to make 
Class 3 contributions. 
 
B.  HISTORY OF SEPARATE ORIGINS AND GRADUAL CONVERGENCE 
1.  History of Alignment of Income Tax and NI 
Income tax and National Insurance were introduced at different times for different 
purposes and looked very different from each other. Income tax was first introduced 
in 1799 to raise revenue for general government expenditure. Its current structure, 
with progressively higher rates applying to income above a personal allowance, was 
introduced in 1973. 
National Insurance was first introduced as a basic social insurance scheme in the UK 
in 1911 and was overhauled significantly expanded in 1948 following the wartime 
Beveridge Report. It was based on the ‘contributory principle’ that benefits received 
should reflect contributions paid. Workers and their employers paid flat-rate NICs 
while in work in return for entitlement to various flat-rate benefits when the 
individual was unemployed, ill or retired. This changed fundamentally in 1961 when 
NICs became earnings-related, making them look rather more like an Income Tax. 
Since then, the two systems have moved closer together in many more ways. The 
following are some of the most important reforms that have contributed to the 
convergence of NI and Income Tax: 
 
•  In 1990, the Income Tax system moved from a joint system of assessment 
(where a married woman’s income was treated as her husband’s income for 
tax purposes) to an individual system, where both partners pay tax separately. 
This moved Income Tax closer to the NI system, which is based on individual 
earnings. Further to this, the married couple’s Income Tax allowance was 
abolished in April 2000 except for people already aged 65 or over at that date. 
•  Income tax and NICs thresholds have been gradually aligned. The levels of 
weekly earnings at which employees and employers start paying NICs were 
aligned with the weekly level of the Income Tax personal allowance
7 in 1999 
(for employer contributions) and 2001 (for employee contributions). And 
Budget 2007 announced that the NI Upper Earnings Limit (and Upper Profits 
                                                 
6 Share fishermen and overseas volunteer development workers have the option of paying higher Class 
2 contributions in return for enhanced benefit entitlement, including jobseeker’s allowance. 
7 By ‘weekly level’, we mean the weekly equivalent, for someone working throughout the year, of the 
level of the annual Income Tax personal allowance.  
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Limit for the self-employed) will be similarly aligned with the higher rate 
Income Tax threshold from April 2009. 
•  Both employee and employer NICs used to have a ‘kink’ in the contributions 
schedule whereby, as weekly earnings passed the lower earnings threshold, 
contributions became payable on the whole of weekly earnings, not just 
earnings above the threshold. This kink was finally eliminated in 1999; 
contributions are now payable only on earnings above the threshold. This is 
equivalent to the treatment of income in the Income Tax system. 
•  NICs used to be distinguished by an overall cap on contributions, which had 
no equivalent in Income Tax. However, the UEL on employer NICs was 
removed in 1985, and the cap on employee and self-employed NICs was 
removed in 2003 with the introduction of 1% NICs above the UEL and UPL, 
although this is still much lower than the rate below the UEL. Meanwhile, the 
series of progressively higher Income Tax rates (ranging from 40% to 83%) 
that existed before 1988 have given way to a single 40% higher rate. 
•  The contributory principle of NI has been eroded over time as the link 
between contributions paid and benefit entitlement has become steadily 
weaker. This is discussed further in Section IV.A. Responsibility for NICs 
policy has been moved from the Department of Work and Pensions to join 
Income Tax policy in HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC); 
NI operational functions have been moved from the separate Contributions 
Agency to HMRC; and NICs decisions can now be appealed to the same 
tribunal as Income Tax decisions (the tax commissioners). 
•  The definitions of earnings have been somewhat aligned, most notably with 
the extension of certain classes of NICs to benefits in kind that were already 
subject to Income Tax. 
There have also been numerous more minor technical alignments, particularly in 
recent years: see Annex B of HM Treasury (2007b). 
 
C.  REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INCOME TAX AND NI 
While Income Tax and NI have steadily converged, and now look quite similar, there 
remain important differences between them: 
(a) NI remains a contributory system, though in practice the links between 
contributions and benefits are weak 
(b) While Income Tax is charged only individuals, NICs have an employer charge 
as well as an employee charge 
(c) There remain significant differences in the bases of the two charges: they 
differ in the definition of earnings, the period of assessment, the treatment of 
multiple employments, self-employment, savings and pensions, the provisions 
applying to young, old and married taxpayers, and several other respects. 
(d) The administrative procedures associated with the two systems are different. 
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 These differences are the main focus of this report, and they are described and 
discussed in detail in Section IV. 
 
 
D.  PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND VIEWS ON INTEGRATION 
The literature on social insurance and the contributory principle is divided between 
advocates and opponents of the principle. The literature specifically addressing 
Income Tax-NI integration, though, is almost universally supportive. As long ago as 
1978, the British Tax Review published an article entitled “National Insurance 
Contributions – A Second Income Tax”, which concluded: 
“in places the disparities between income tax and national insurance 
contributions are distinctions without differences, and…in other places 
the disparities may be unnecessary and unfair…In practice even more 
than in theory the contribution system is merely an adapted form of the 
income tax system, and its separate status is to some extent a mere 
illusion.”
8
This sets the tone for much of the literature that follows. Dilnot, Kay and Morris 
(1984) proposed the integration of Income Tax and NICs as part of a broader 
integration of the tax and social security system. Webb (1992) is the most thorough 
analysis of integration to date, and concluded: 
“A comprehensive integration of the systems of income tax and 
National Insurance contributions would produce a major improvement 
to the structure of the personal direct tax system in the UK. The tax 
system would be more coherent, the scope for removing structural 
anomalies would be greater, and the scope for tax avoidance would be 
reduced…now is the time to begin moving towards that objective.” 
Dilnot (1995) argues that integration would be desirable and that “the main continuing 
barrier to income and social security tax integration is politics and public 
perceptions.” Reed and Dixon (2005) also advocate integration.  
Reports by business groups (British Chambers of Commerce, 2004) and professional 
groups (Chartered Institute of Taxation, 1998) both suggest that full integration is 
likely to be the ideal long-term goal, but then both elect to focus on incremental 
technical steps towards alignment in the shorter term. 
Similarly, three reports for the government on technical payroll areas reported 
widespread positive views on a merger but do not pursue it as their remits were too 
narrow: 
•  Centre for Fiscal Studies University of Bath (1998, p.90, para. 6.5.2) noted 
that employers were keen on integration, but said that such policy matters 
were outside its remit. 
                                                 
8 Williams (1978) 
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•  Better Regulation Task Force (2000, pp.20-21) found that stakeholders 
generally said they could not, or could no longer, understand the reason for 
having two separate charges for tax and NI. The tax force determined that it 
was important that the Government be made aware of the consensus in favour 
of such a merger amongst both the representative bodies and the individuals 
who contributed their views to the report, and while noting that a full-scale 
merger of the two systems could only be a long-term goal, commented that a 
merger would have “really big regulatory gains.” It stopped there, however, on 
the grounds that such policy matters were beyond its remit, and focussed 
instead on more technical alignment issues.  
•  Carter (2001) is a review of the burden of employers’ payroll obligations and 
is restricted to technical issues, but notes (p.16, para. 5.1) that many employers 
and employer representatives bemoaned the Carter Review’s narrow terms of 
reference and called for radical simplification of the tax system. 
A fourth, Taylor (1998), had a broader remit but chose not to investigate a merger: 
p.13, para. 2.13, notes that the suggestion had been made and is “understandable”, but 
then merely notes the radicalism of the idea and concludes that it is “more 
worthwhile” to focus on reforms that do not raise “such major policy questions”. 
Taken together, these strongly suggest a pattern of support for integration in the 
academic literature and in the tax practitioner and business communities. This 
impression received further support from a survey of businesses conducted by the Tax 
Reform Commission (established by the Conservative Party and chaired by Lord 
Forsyth) in conjunction with the Confederation of British Industry, and Institute of 
Directors and the British Chambers of Commerce, which found that 65% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition: “a system which 
combines national insurance and income tax using rates so as to leave the total tax 
burden unchanged would be beneficial to my business.” Several survey respondents 
also volunteered a merger of Income Tax and NICs as the tax reform they would most 
like to see. The Tax Reform Commission itself proposed considering a phased merger 
of NICs and Income Tax.
9
Government publications all reject the idea: most fully in HMSO (1986), and most 
recently in Inland Revenue (2000), which notes the suggestion of integration and lists 
some of the questions it would raise, but then states that “the Government is not 
persuaded that radical reform of the tax and NICs systems is the best way of 
delivering worthwhile simplifications for employers.” 
Despite this weight of opinion, successive governments have been steadfastly 
unpersuaded of the case for integration. Inland Revenue (2000), for example, notes 
the suggestion of integration, lists some of the questions it would raise, and then states 
that “the Government is not persuaded that radical reform of the tax and NICs systems 
is the best way of delivering worthwhile simplifications for employers.” 
                                                 
9 Tax Reform Commission (2006) 
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The fullest Government analysis of integration remains that of a Green Paper issued 
by the Thatcher government in 1986, one chapter of which examined at some length 
the merits of integrating Income Tax and employees’ NICs (it was assumed 
employers’ contributions to the National Insurance Fund would remain in any 
event).
10 The Green Paper began by noting that it had frequently been suggested that 
it would be more efficient if the existing two charges on earnings with their different 
but overlapping bases were replaced with one combined charge [para 7.2]. The main 
arguments cited in favour of integration were that it would simplify the overall 
structure of the administrative system and would reduce the compliance burdens 
which employers faced in dealing with two separate systems. However, these benefits 
had to be weighed against the major distributional effects of such a change, the need 
to find a satisfactory way of upholding the contributory principle and the need for a 
new separate charge for employers’ NICs. 
In terms of distributional effects, the Green Paper identified the ‘losers’ under 
integration would be those taxpayers with income not currently subject to employee 
NICs, such as those with earnings above the UEL, investment income, state and 
occupational pensions. Elderly taxpayers and other pensioners were considered to be 
the largest group likely to suffer disadvantage, since they did not (and do not) pay 
NICs. While the paper’s authors conceded that distributional effects were not in 
themselves a conclusive argument against tax changes, they concluded that wide-
ranging shifts on the lines described above would be hard to justify on either 
economic or social grounds [para 7.7]. 
Next, the Green Paper argued that the contributory principle would be seriously 
weakened by a combined charge applied to all income [para 7.9]. 
The Green Paper then considered whether a combined charge with limited coverage 
would be able to mitigate the distributional consequences while still remaining 
faithful to the contributory principle [para 7.14]. The options considered were 
exempting persons/income from coverage (e.g. the elderly), charging different rates 
(e.g. lower rate on investment income), or making it so that the persons who paid the 
combined charge were in essence those who paid Income Tax and employees’ NIC 
under the existing system, which would mean a higher combined rate, and higher tax 
for those with income above the UEL. While this limited charge was thought to be 
less damaging to contributory principle, it was rejected on the basis that some of the 
same difficulties would probably remain and, more importantly, it would undermine 
the main aim of the combined charge: simplicity. 
Ultimately, the Green Paper concluded that the benefits of a combined Income Tax 
and employees’ NIC charge would be unlikely to justify the ensuing upheaval, and 
integration was not pursued. 
In Budget 2006, the Government said it would review the case for closer alignment of 
Income Tax and NI, with a view to improving the outcome for the low paid and to 
reduce burdens on employers, especially smaller employers.
11 In October 2007 HM 
Treasury released the results of its review.
12 Taking the current policy framework as a 
                                                 
10 HMSO (1986). 
11 HM Treasury (2006), para 5.87. 
12 HM Treasury (2007b) 
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given, the review examined the case for making NICs operate more like Income Tax, 
in particular by moving to an annual basis of assessment and cumulative collection for 
NICs. The review concluded that the benefits from such alignment did not outweigh 
the costs, and thus recommended against it. In particular, the review concluded that 
net savings for employers would be smaller than might be expected owing to 
widespread and increasing use of computerised payroll systems. 
However, a few areas were identified where improvements could be made to the 
current system to reduce the administrative burden on employers: 
•  collecting tax on benefits in kind and expenses through the payroll; 
•  improving and aligning information and guidance on tax and NICs; and 
•  improving collection of NICs for the self-employed. 
Given the results of HM Treasury’s review, it now appears unlikely that any 
substantial further piecemeal alignment of the two systems will be made. However, it 
is important to note that the review looked at a single reform in isolation (moving 
NICs to a cumulative annual basis) and declined to consider any reform that had 
wider policy implications. The role of this project, in contrast, is explicitly to consider 
the policy framework as a whole, and it may be that radical reform has more to 
commend it than adjustment of a single feature of the system. 
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III.  POTENTIAL GAINS FROM INTEGRATION 
The key potential gain from integrating the Income Tax and NI systems is simplicity. 
Simplification has two components – greater transparency and reduced administrative 
and compliance costs. Each of these is discussed in turn below.  
Aside from the gains from integration per se, the rethink associated with integration 
gives an opportunity to consider afresh which is the better approach where Income 
Tax and NI currently differ and apply it consistently. This could have benefits in 
terms of reducing avoidance as well as administration and compliance costs. More 
generally, it would be an opportunity to rationalise the system and bring it back to 
first principles, to make the system fundamentally fairer and more efficient. Such 
opportunities for rationalisation are considered in later sections of this report, but we 
do not list them as benefits of integration as such, because they could in principle be 
pursued independently. 
 
A.  TRANSPARENCY 
Income Tax and NICs are very similar taxes. But they are not identical, and their 
combined effect is a function of their combined rates and their different bases, which 
makes it rather obscure. Integrating Income Tax and NI would make the overall rate 
structure of labour income taxes more obvious.
13 Moreover, the balance of taxation 
between earnings and savings income, self-employed and employees, under- and 
over-pension age, etc, would be more explicit and easier to debate, rather than (as at 
the moment) an opaque consequence of the balance between Income Tax and NICs, 
determined by the political attractions of raising NICs rather than Income Tax. 
Section IV.A explains that the hypothecation associated with NI is virtually 
meaningless, and that the contributory nature of NI has become largely a fiction, in 
the sense that the link between contributions paid and benefits received – particularly 
at the margin – is vanishingly weak. There is some evidence, however, that people 
believe these links to be stronger than they really are (Stafford, 1998). This may lead 
them to misunderstand the effects of policy: to believe that NICs are ‘buying them’ 
guaranteed benefits or an improved NHS in a way that Income Tax is not, for 
example, and perhaps to be more willing to pay NICs than to pay Income Tax. While 
it could be argued that taxpayers’ paying more willingly should be welcomed, 
achieving that through maintaining an illusion surely should not be, and an integration 
that improved taxpayers’ understanding must be desirable. 
The case for integration in terms of transparency is perhaps best illustrated by the case 
of the 2001 Labour Party general election manifesto and the 2002 Budget. The 2001 
manifesto included a pledge not to increase rates of Income Tax, but no such pledge 
on NICs. If the two taxes were truly identical, such a pledge would have been wholly 
meaningless. But the taxes were different, so the victorious Labour government could 
deny claims that it was reneging on the spirit, if not the letter, of its manifesto pledge 
when in the 2002 Budget it announced an increase in NICs rates to take effect the 
                                                 
13  The combined rate schedule is already becoming somewhat more transparent as the thresholds are 
aligned, though to some extent this alignment is illusory as long as the tax bases remain different. 
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following year. A NICs rise, unlike an Income Tax rise, did not hurt savers and 
pensioners, it was argued. It is doubtful whether it had been clear to voters that the 
manifesto pledge was in effect restricted to such groups, but an integrated system 
would not allow for such confusion and suspicion, which can generate only mistrust. 
Furthermore, the announced NICs increase was presented as “to pay for the NHS”. In 
the context of the 2002 Budget, it could just as easily have been described as “to pay 
for new tax credits” or “to help reduce Government borrowing”. The Government’s 
preferred description gained widespread acceptance partly because of the perception 
of a direct link between NICs and the NHS. No meaningful link exists (as explained 
in Section IV.A), and insofar as misapprehension influenced the perception of the 
reform, it hindered a balanced understanding of policy. 
 
B.  ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE COSTS 
The existence of two separate systems entails substantial costs: compliance costs for 
employers, employees and the self-employed, and administration costs for 
government. Integrating the two systems has the potential to reduce these burdens 
substantially.  
 
1.  Employers 
For employers, calculating two earnings figures and two payments to deduct for each 
employee represents a sizeable administrative burden. Earnings must be calculated 
differently for the different charges, taking into account the different treatments of 
pension contributions, charitable donations, expenses and various types of benefits in 
kind; even were the earnings figure in a particular pay period the same, Income Tax 
must be withheld on a cumulative annual basis whereas NICs is based only on the 
individual pay period; Income Tax is calculated using a tax code whereas NICs have 
the paraphernalia of table letters; there are different reporting requirements with the 
two systems, and different procedures for correcting errors. The complexities of 
dealing with new or departing employees and with employees with more than one job 
are different in the two cases. Dealing with all this has become much less onerous 
since widespread computerisation, but is still significant, especially for small firms, as 
will be illustrated below. And while computerisation has helped ease the burden of 
calculation, changes in the economy, such as individuals’ moving jobs more 
frequently, have made troublesome cases more common.  
Several studies have considered the potential compliance cost benefits for employers 
from increased alignment or integration of the Income Tax and NI systems. A 1998 
report by the Centre for Fiscal Studies at the University of Bath (widely known as the 
‘Bath Report’) on employer tax compliance costs recommended, on the assumption 
that PAYE and NI would not be amalgamated (though employer calls for such a 
merger were noted
14), that the then Inland Revenue and Contributions Agency go as 
far as they possibly can in achieving consistency and uniformity across PAYE and 
                                                 
14 Centre for Fiscal Studies, University of Bath (1998), para 5.6.2. 
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NIC operations, so as to minimise compliance costs to employers.
 15 In particular, the 
report recommended that the treatment of benefits in kind should be common across 
PAYE and NI Class1A contributions.
16 As discussed above, increased alignment has 
occurred, though significant differences in the tax and NI treatment of benefits in kind 
still remain and are discussed in Section IV.C.1(a). 
The Bath Report also concluded that the costs of complying with payroll tax 
regulations fell disproportionately on small businesses in that the ‘bottom’ 30% (by 
PAYE and NICs collected) bear 75% of the compliance costs.
17 Compliance costs per 
employee for 1995-96 were estimated to be £288 per annum for employers in the 1-4 
employee size band but only £5 per annum for those with more than 5000 
employees.
18 Finally, the Bath Report emphasised that for the very smallest payrolls 
costs may be extremely high because even the smallest employer has to become 
familiar with his or her tax obligations, set up a system, store tax documentation, deal 
with enquiries and so on;
 19 this conclusion is just as appropriate today as it was in 
1998. While the findings are interesting, since the 1990s computerisation has 
continued apace and many changes in employer payroll tax regulations have taken 
place– additional Income Tax and NI alignment has occurred, the Inland Revenue and 
Contribution Agency merged, responsibility for administering working tax credit 
came and went – so the Bath Report pound cost figures are likely to be somewhat out 
of date. 
On the heels of the Bath Report, the Better Regulation Task Force considered a 
number of ways in which employer payroll tax costs could be reduced, particularly for 
small business.
20 Interestingly, the tax force’s report stated that while the then recent 
partial alignment of tax and NI treatment of benefits in kind advanced equity between 
cash pay and non-cash benefits, the alignment was viewed by employers as increasing 
their overall burden, not least because it substantially increased their NICs:
21 
taxpayers do not always welcome alignment where it means they have to pay more! 
Employers’ burdens in this respect have only increased since then. Of greater interest, 
the report also concluded that substantial regulatory gains that could be achieved by 
merging PAYE and NICs into a single charge.  
A recent study of the tax administrative burden of UK businesses conducted by 
KPMG provides a more-up-date picture of the compliance costs for employers under 
the separate Income Tax and NI systems. KPMG concluded that the administrative 
burden of employer taxes is £759 million annually, or 15% of the total burden placed 
on business.
22 KPMG found that about one third of the total burden is payments for 
                                                 
15 Ibid., para 6.3. 
16 Ibid., para 6.3.8. 
17 Ibid., para 3.3.1. 
18 Ibid., para 3.3.2. The Report alsot noted that these costs were offset by significant cash-flow benefits 
from having the use of withheld Income Tax and NICs for a period of time before remittance. These 
are genuine benefits from administering these taxes; however, they are a rather different type of 
compliance cost issue, and not the type that might be affected by integration of Income Tax and NI.  
19 Bath Report, para 3.3.3. 
20 Better Regulation Task Force, ‘Payroll Review’, March 2000, available online at 
http://www.brc.gov.uk/downloads/pdf/payroll.pdf (hereinafter the ‘BRTF Report’). 
21 BRTF Report, p 20. 
22 KPMG, ‘Administrative Burdens – HMRC Measurement Project Report, Report by Tax Area, Part 
11: Employer Taxes’, 20 March 2006, p 10 (hereinafter the ‘KMPG Report on Employer Taxes’). The 
full KPMG Report is available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/better-regulation/kpmg.htm. 
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third-party services; larger businesses will often use specialist service providers to 
handle their PAYE/NIC processes while many smaller businesses will use their 
accountant to provide this service.
23 The high burden figure is at least in part due to 
the fact that all businesses with employees have to comply with the main employer 
tax obligations. The key burdens for employers were found to relate to returning 
information to HMRC on forms – the P11D (annual return for expenses and benefits 
in kind) and the P35 and P14 (annual returns for PAYE/NICs).
24 Furthermore, from 
interviews conducted with businesses, KPMG observed that employer taxes are a 
common area for business complaint, and that businesses feel that the system is too 
complex, a common irritation being the two sets of rules that apply to PAYE and 
NICs.
25 As was the case with the Bath Report and Better Regulation Task Force 
findings, many businesses suggested harmonising aspects of the employer tax rules as 
one way to reduce the tax administrative burden; in particular, KPMG found that 
alignment of PAYE with NI was ‘a very strong theme’.
26
Importantly for present purposes, the KPMG report separated the cost of PAYE and 
NICs information obligations on employers, with NICs obligations measured in terms 
of their incremental burden over and above the PAYE burden.
27  This provides a 
helpful indication of at least some of the additional administrative burden on 
employers attributable to maintaining separate Income Tax and NI systems, and thus 
the potential administrative benefits from amalgamating the two systems. With 
respect to the P35/P14 returns, the administrative burden associated with PAYE was 
estimated to be £131.22 million, while the additional administrative burden from NIC 
was estimated to be £78.15 million.
28 Other significant administrative burdens 
attributed solely to NIC information obligations related to monthly payment of NICs 
(£43.03 million) and inspection of employers’ NICs records (£25.14 million).
29 
Overall, the administrative burden specifically attributed to just these three NICs 
information obligations comprised almost 20% of the total employer tax 
administrative burden of £759 million. 
It might appear that the apparently higher burden of PAYE than NICs is a measure of 
how much cheaper it is to administer NICs than PAYE, and therefore gives guidance 
as to the magnitude of savings that would arise by making an integrated system ‘look 
like’ NICs rather than PAYE. This is not quite the case, however: since employers 
were asked for the incremental burden of NICs over and above PAYE, costs incurred 
once for running both systems would not be included in the NICs burden. We have 
some guidance as to how much would be saved by abolishing NICs and retaining 
PAYE; however,  we do not know how much would be saved by abolishing PAYE 
and retaining NICs, since some costs that are incurred under PAYE (and therefore not 
counted as incremental costs of NICs) might nevertheless need to be retained if PAYE 
were abolished and NICs retained. 
                                                 
23 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 4. 
24 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 14. 
25 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 4. 
26 KPMG, ‘Administrative Burdens – HMRC Measurement Project Report, vol 1’, 20 March 2006, 
para 5.2. and KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 23. 
27 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 9. 
28 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 14, Table 6. 
29 KPMG Report on Employer Taxes, p 14, Table 6. 
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In summary, it is beyond doubt that running a separate Income Tax and NI system is 
costlier than running only one. Just how much could be saved is not as clear. The best 
estimate of potential savings for employers under an integrated system would appear 
to be the approximately £179 million annual incremental cost of NICs identified by 
the KMPG study.
30 This total is perhaps surprisingly low. It is important to recognise, 
however, that the Standard Cost Model used in the KPMG study captures only a 
narrow measure of compliance costs, excluding, for example, costs associated with 
working out what must be complied with, dealing with changes, and tax planning, 
whichcould be significant. 
 
2.  Employees 
Because primary responsibility for complying with both the Income Tax and NICs 
systems falls on employers, the benefits for employees from an integrated Income 
Taxcharge would be smaller. For those people who check that their PAYE code is 
correct, that the right amount of tax has been deducted at source, etc, it would clearly 
be easier to do this once than twice. Moreover, one system instead of two would 
probably mean less chance for mistakes, whose correction entails hassle for the 
individual (as well as the employer and HMRC). A merged system would not remove 
the need for self-assessment, so there is no reason to believe that the burden of self-
assessment would change. However, the full implications of integration would depend 
on how it is done: for example, the choice of how to define the tax base could 
significantly affect the numbers needing to self-assess. 
 
3.  The Self-Employed 
Little data is available on the compliance costs of the current system for the self-
employed. The regime for the self-employed differs from that for employees in 
several ways, some of which make it more complicated but others of which make it 
simpler – the self-employed may suffer less than employers from dealing with areas 
such as expenses, benefits in kind and share schemes, for example However, the 
inherently greater or lesser complexity of the system is probably much less important 
than the economies of scale available to large employers but not available to the self-
employed. The self-employed face all the costs of having to understand and operate 
the system just in order to pay themselves; large employers, in contrast,  can share 
these fixed costs between many employees and take advantage of tools such as 
computerisation and dedicated payroll departments to minimise the burden of dealing 




                                                 
30 Source: Unpublished KPMG data supplied by HMRC. 
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4.  Government 
The most obvious cost to the Government imposed by having two separate systems is 
the duplication of work when processing returns, checking that the right amount of tax 
has been remitted, undertaking investigations, and so on. But far larger than this is the 
cost associated with the contributory system of NI. The Government must maintain 
the contribution record of each individual in order to calculate benefit entitlements 
decades after the contributions were paid. And the National Insurance Fund must be 
maintained, invested, audited, etc. separately from general Exchequer revenues. 
Precise figures are difficult to come by, but if some or all of these activities were 
deemed unnecessary the potential savings could be extremely large. 
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IV. REMAINING DIFFERENCES: BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION? 
This section identifies and examines the key remaining differences between Income 
Tax and NI, with a view to determining the extent to which these differences 
represent a barrier to integration of Income Tax and NI. 
 
A.  THE CONTRIBUTORY PRINCIPLE 
Historically and politically, by far the most important difference between Income Tax 
and National Insurance is that NI has embodied the ‘contributory principle’: a link 
between contributions and benefit entitlements.  
The Beveridge Report envisaged a ‘true’ social insurance scheme, with an actuarial 
link between contributions paid and benefit entitlements for each individual.
31 This 
actuarial link was quickly broken, and the relationship has become steadily weaker 
over the years to the point where it is barely recognizable at all. Some people receive 
entitlements without paying NICs (because of, for example, the gap between the LEL 
and the earnings threshold, home responsibilities protection for carers, credits for 
periods spent unemployed or on disability benefits, and the availability of incapacity 
benefit to those without contributions records if disabled from a young age); others 
see no benefits from paying additional contributions (because, for example, incapacity 
benefit is means-tested on private pension income, NICs paid in a given year can be 
insufficient to generate an additional year’s pension entitlement, means-tested benefits 
erode the incremental value of contributory entitlements, and contributors might 
already have a full contribution record). Employer Class 1, 1A and 1B NICs and self-
employed Class 4 NICs give rise to no entitlements; they simply raise revenue. 
Throughout the many reforms to both contributions and benefits that have taken place 
over the years, minimal attention has been paid to the actuarial fairness of the link 
between the two. 
The present Government seems to interpret the contributory principle in a different 
way, with entitlements not actuarially reflecting NICs payments but rewarding 
broader economic or social contributions (such as working or caring) made to society 
as a whole. However, it is hard to interpret the current system as fitting even with this 
rather vaguer objective: as Johnson and Stears (1996) put it, “why somebody earning 
£50 a week should be excluded from benefit when the unemployed are not is a 
question to which it is hard to find a coherent answer.” 
An argument often made in defence of the contributory principle is that it protects 
benefit entitlements: if people feel they have paid their dues and earned their pension 
rights, it is very difficult for governments to break their implied pension promises, 
and this provides welcome security for workers planning for their retirement. But it is 
not clear that this is true: governments have changed benefit levels (and contribution 
conditions) for people who have already paid contributions – most famously by 
                                                 
31 Beveridge (1942). For discussions of this and subsequent developments, and the debates over the 
role of the contributory principle, see Dilnot, Kay and Morris (1984), Creedy and Disney (1985), 
Bennett (1993), House of Commons Social Security Committee (2000) and Hills (2003). 
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linking the basic state pension level to prices rather than earnings. And, to quote 
Richard Disney: 
‘You can make the argument, “I have paid contributions all my life. I 
ought to get more pension.” Why not make the same argument: “I 
have paid Income Tax all my life. Why do I not get a pension I 
deserve?” To me, they are almost identical statements.’
32
The false sense of security induced by the misplaced feeling that future benefit levels 
are protected may indeed be rather dangerous. The honouring of past pension 
promises is a matter of current political pressures, not contractual obligation. 
The hypothecation of NI revenue is even more illusory: since the uses of the 
contributions neither constrain nor are constrained by the revenue from contributions, 
it is entirely a matter of meaningless labelling. A set of very complicated rules 
determine which parts of which classes of contributions are notionally allocated to the 
NHS; but this constitutes only a small part of NHS funding, and if the Government 
wishes to increase NHS spending it can do so from general taxation. Contributory 
benefits are notionally financed from the NI Fund, but in years where the Fund was 
not sufficient to finance benefits, the Fund was topped up from general taxation 
revenues, and in years (as now) when contributions substantially exceed outlays, the 
Fund builds up a surplus, largely invested in gilts: the Government is simply lending 
itself money. These exercises in shifting money from one arm of Government to 
another maintain a notionally separate Fund, but merely serve to illustrate that NI 
contributions and NI expenditure proceed on essentially independent paths. The 
Government could equally well declare that a quarter of NICs revenue goes towards 
financing defence spending, and no-one would notice the difference. 
There are arguments to be made in favour of a genuine social insurance scheme, but 
that is emphatically not what the UK has now (and this report does not consider how 
one might be introduced). Indeed, Johnson and Stears (1996) argue that since the vast 
majority of future retirees will be entitled to full state pension anyway (because of 
increased female employment rates and the extension of home responsibilities 
protection etc), the contributory system is becoming a tool that achieves almost 
nothing. HM Treasury (2007b) reports that by 2025 over 90% of people reaching state 
pension age will be entitled to full state pension, and presumably many of the 
remaining 10% will also have almost-full state pension entitlements: is it worth 
maintaining all the complex, opaque and burdensome machinery of the contributory 
system in order to exclude the remaining few people from entitlement? Given the 
peculiarity of the rules determining exclusion, as discussed above, it is far from clear 
how many of these people we would really want to exclude in any case. 
In this context, it is natural to argue that (unless the UK is to move towards a genuine 
social insurance scheme) the pretence of a contributory principle should be 
abandoned. Removal of the contributory system would require some alternative to be 
put in place for determining state pension entitlement: it could not be left a matter 
only of age, or else foreigners would have a large incentive to retire to Britain, which 
(aside from any considerations of fairness) would be prohibitively expensive for the 
UK Exchequer.  
                                                 
32 Quoted in House of Commons Social Security Committee (2000). 
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The obvious solution is to base entitlement on years of residence (or citizenship, or 
something similar). This could certainly be implemented for building up entitlements 
in future years. However, it would not be easy, and may be impossible, to apply a 
residence test retrospectively for past years of accrual: the Government does not 
currently keep records of individuals’ past residence in the country, for example. 
Various records could help to establish residence in particular past years (for example, 
having paid any Income Tax or NICs in that year); but ultimately, if an individual has 
paid no Income Tax or NICs in a particular year, the Government has no reliable way 
of finding out whether he or she was not in the country or just not working. The only 
viable options, therefore, would be either to assume that all existing residents had 
lived their entire lives to date in the UK – which would be feasible but rather 
expensive – or to continue to use existing contribution records to calculate 
entitlements accrued in past years. If the latter option were taken, the contribution 
conditions could still be reformed – to give entitlement to anyone who paid any 
contributions in a given year, for example. But retrospectively relaxing (or indeed 
abolishing) the contribution conditions in this way, as well as being costly, could be 
seen as unfair on certain groups, such as women who chose not to opt for the married 
women’s reduced rate of NICs despite being entitled to do so.  
Using residence to establish future accruals but contribution records to establish past 
accruals would mean a transition several decades long, since those who have now 
been in the labour market for only a few years would still have their pensions 
determined by their contributions records to date. It would therefore represent much 
less of a simplification than if residence or current circumstances alone could be used 
to determine entitlements. But it would nevertheless represent a substantial 
administrative saving, and increase in transparency, relative to the labyrinthine 
system. 
Politically, the prospects for overtly abandoning the contributory system as described 
above look slim. The Government has rejected calls for a citizen’s or resident’s 
pension from the Pensions Commission and the National Association of Pension 
Funds, amongst others. The continuation, and perhaps gradual further decline, of the 
vestiges of a contributory system appears more likely. In that context, a key question 
for this report is whether the current contributory system (or something similar) could 
be maintained under a merged Income Tax / NI regime without making the new tax 
prohibitively complicated. 
There seem to be no serious obstacles to devising a set of contribution conditions 
based on a merged tax that closely mimic the current rules. If a merged tax applied to 
savings income as well as earnings, for example, it would still be possible to base 
contribution records on the tax paid on employment income alone. However, in this 
area as in others, integration of Income Tax and NI would provide a good opportunity 
to rethink whether the current rules are what we would ideally like to achieve, and to 
reform them if not. 
 
B.  PAYMENT OF NICS BY EMPLOYERS 
Responsibility for paying Income Tax and employee NICs legally rests with the 
individual; however, employers are also legally liable to pay NICs on their 
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employees’ earnings. Discussions of integrating Income Tax and NICs often assume 
that Income Tax and employee NICs would be merged, leaving employer NICs in 
place separately.
33 But literally merging Income Tax and NI into a truly single system 
could be interpreted as meaning levying only one charge, not separate ones on 
employer and employee. Is this desirable and feasible? Alternatively, if integration 
proceeded in other areas while maintaining separate employer and employee taxes, 
how much of the benefit of integration would be lost? 
Our starting point here is to note what is the wrong way to think about this issue. This 
is emphatically not a question of the appropriate balance of taxation between 
businesses and individuals. Many people are led to think in these terms by the 
different names of the taxes and the different legal liability. But basic economic 
theory asserts that in the long run these things are irrelevant to the effective incidence 
of the tax – who is ultimately made worse off by it. To determine the effective 
incidence of a tax, we must look through the corporate veil and realise that  only 
people – the company’s shareholders (through lower profits), employees (through 
lower wages) and customers (through higher prices) – ultimately feel the pain. How 
the burden of a tax is shared between these groups may be complicated, depending on 
market structures and so on. But the distribution of the ultimate burden does not 
depend on the name of the tax, who has legal liability, or who is responsible for 
remitting it. Employees care about their take-home pay, and employers care about the 
cost of hiring someone; it is these that ultimately determine outcomes, not whether the 
wedge in between is labelled an “employer” or “employee” tax: that just affects what 
point in between employer cost and take-home pay we label “earnings”. A shift 
between identical employee and employer taxes should in the long run lead to a 
corresponding adjustment in earnings to leave take-home pay and employer cost 
unchanged. This conclusion follows directly from the premises that prices (in this 
case the price of labour) are determined by the interaction of supply and demand 
and.that money illusion (people’s misperception of how much £1 can buy when the 
value of the currency changes) does not last forever. 
Noting the long-run irrelevance of the balance between employer and employee taxes 
on earnings is not to belittle the issues that would be associated with a shift from one 
to the other. As Keynes famously wrote: “in the long run we’re all dead.”
34 The “short 
run” might last a very long time, and the problems during that period might 
potentially be quite large. The point is that arguments over the merits of keeping 
separate employer and employee taxes ought not to be about employers and 
employees each paying their fair share – though it is important to recognise that the 
public debate might well be framed in those terms. The principled debate should 
rather be about whether the benefits of integration justify the short-run dislocation. 
The potential benefits from one integrated charge, as for integration as a whole, are 
transparency and a reduction in administration and compliance costs. 
The administrative and compliance cost savings from moving to a single integrated 
charge are obvious: it is clearly easer to operate one system than two. But the 
magnitude of the savings is much less clear. The cost of having two separate taxes can 
be reduced, either by making the extra tax very simple, or by aligning the two taxes. If 
                                                 
33 See, for example, HMSO (1986). 
34 Keynes (1923) 
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the tax bases were identical, there would be relatively little cost to applying two rate 
schedules and writing two cheques instead of one, whereas at the moment there are 
significant differences between earnings assessed for employer NICs and employee 
NICs, as well as much bigger differences from Income Tax. Removing the employer 
tax altogether, or (failing that) simplifying it, could also makes other practical 
problems much easier to resolve: see, for example, the discussions in Sections III.C.3 
and III.C.6. 
The transparency benefit of a single, integrated Income Tax-NI charge would be in 
making people aware of the full tax wedge imposed on their earnings, by bringing 
together the three charges (Income Tax, employee NICs and employer NICs) into a 
single rate schedule. If the rates “sound high”, all the more reason to do it, since that 
implies that they are currently being levied without people realising their implications. 
And if people do not already appreciate that employer NICs damage their 
employment prospects and reduce their take-home pay just like Income Tax, then 
once again, all the more reason to make it explicit. Such transparency might not be in 
a governing party’s self-interest, but from a neutral standpoint it is surely a 
worthwhile objective. In addition, integration would help to clarify the level of 
taxation of earnings as compared with savings, as discussed in Section IV.C.5. 
A serious limitation to the transparency benefits from abolishing employer NICs is the 
complexity of the required compensating increase in employee taxes. The correct 
adjustment does not consist simply of adding 12.8% to all existing rates. To see this, 
note that we could levy 87.2% Income Tax and 12.8% employer NICs on a worker’s 
earnings, and despite the heavy taxation the worker would still receive something. 
However, if we replaced that system with a 100% Income Tax the worker would 
receive no net pay at all. This is because (a) employee taxes are levied on a tax-
inclusive base (taken out of earnings), whereas employer taxes are levied on a tax-
exclusive base (paid on top of earnings); and (b) employer and employee taxes apply 
multiplicatively, not additively. 12.8% on a tax-exclusive basis is equivalent to 
11.35% on a tax-inclusive basis (0.128 / 1.128 = 0.1135).
35 But we cannot simply add 
11.35% to employee NICs, because the taxes are multiplicative: we levy employee 
NICs (and levy Income Tax, and means-test tax credits) on what remains after 
deducting 11.35% from the total cost paid by the employer. For someone facing no 
employee taxes, we could neutralise the abolition of 12.8% employer NICs by 
imposing an 11.35% employee tax; but for someone already facing 41% employee 
taxes the abolition of employee NICs would be neutralised by a 6.7% employee tax 
(0.1135 x 0.59 = 0.067).
36 Because rates of Income Tax, employee NICs and tax 
credit withdrawal are applied additively to the same base, it is the combined rates of 
                                                 
35 A more widely known example of the conversion between tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive bases is 
that a 17.5% VAT (expressed as a percentage of the VAT-exclusive price) is equivalent to a tax of 
14.9% on the retail sale price (including the tax), or (in the absence of saving) a 14.9% Income Tax. A 
100% VAT, a 50% Income Tax and a 100% employer NICs all have the same effect of halving 
purchasing power. The reasoning and calculation are exactly the same in each case. 
36 Again there is a parallel with VAT. For someone earning £100 and paying no Income Tax, 
introducing a 100% VAT would be equivalent to introducing a 50% Income Tax (either would leave 
him buying half as much as if the tax were not there); but for someone earning £100 and already paying 
50% of it in Income Tax (leaving him with £50 to spend), introducing a 100% VAT would be 
equivalent to raising his Income Tax rate to 75% (again, either additional tax halves his purchasing 
power) – a rise of 25 percentage points, not 50 percentage points as for the non-taxpayer. So if we 
wished to abolish a 100% VAT and increase Income Tax instead, should we increase the rate of 
Income Tax by 50p or by 25p? 
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these that need to be taken into account. Levying 12.8% employer NICs above a 
threshold is equivalent to increasing earnings (except the part below the threshold) by 
12.8% and then levying an 11.35% tax on what remains after applying Income Tax, 
employee NICs and tax credit withdrawal to the new (higher) earnings figure. Thus 
there is unfortunately no single number by which we could raise the employee tax 
rates to compensate exactly for abolishing employer NICs: each current rate must be 
adjusted separately, with smaller rises to higher rates. It should also be noted that all 
thresholds above the tax-free earnings threshold would need to rise by 12.8% to keep 
pace with higher notional earnings. 
For simple cases, we can achieve a neutral shift by applying a different increase to 
each rate, along with threshold adjustments. This has become simpler and more 
accurate following the simplifications announced in Budget 2007 (abolishing the 10% 
Income Tax band and aligning the UEL with the effective higher rate threshold). 
Applied to the hypothetical system that applies all the Budget 2007 announcements to 
the 2007–08 system, the appropriate changes would be: 
•  increase the main rate of employee NICs from 11% to 18.8% 
•  increase the rate of employee NICs above the UEL from 1% to 7.7% 
•  increase the effective UEL and higher rate threshold from £40,550 to £45,070 
(formally, the UEL rises from £780 to £865 and basic rate limit from £35,325 
to 39,845) 
•  reduce the main tax credit withdrawal rate from 39% to 34.6% 
•  reduce the higher tax credit withdrawal rate from 6.7% to 5.9% 
•  increase the main tax credit threshold from £6,380 to £6,530 
•  increase the child-tax-credit-only threshold from £15,175 to £16,450 
•  increase the second tax credit threshold from £50,000 to £55,730 
For a single earner with no other income, increasing her earnings-above-£5,225 by 
12.8%, abolishing employer NICs and introducing the above changes would leave 
both her cost to her employer and her disposable income unchanged. However, for 
people whose income for tax and tax credit purposes is different from that for NICs 
purposes, the changes are not quite equivalent: people with significant savings income 
could gain, while because of joint assessment two-earner couples on tax credits would 
gain up to £231 per year (assuming all income is from earnings).  
The complexity of the adjustment outlined above arises because of the opaque nature 
of the existing regime, not because of complexity in the new regime. The end result of 
these adjustments would be a simpler-looking system than the current one. But this 
analysis does make clear that, however transparent the new system, the process of 
getting there from the existing system might be difficult and far from transparent. 
As mentioned above, the potential benefits of moving to a single integrated charge in 
terms of reduced costs and increased transparency must be weighed against the 
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dislocation associated with transition. The immediate effect of a shift from employer 
to employee taxes – before anything has time to adjust – is that take-home pay would 
fall and employers’ profits increase. Earnings would rise in response to this, 
essentially by 12.8% (slightly less, in fact: the part of earnings above the tax-free 
earnings threshold would rise by 12.8%) so that they matched what earnings plus 
employer NICs had been before. But note that for this actually to happen, all existing 
employment contracts would have to be revised. 
The government also would presumably increase the minimum wage by 12.8% (but 
again, only increase that part – if any – above what they assume to be the hourly 
equivalent of the earnings threshold). If the increased employee tax applied to social 
security benefits (see Section IV.C.5), the government would have to increase the 
rates of those benefits accordingly. By default, benefit rates that are linked to average 
earnings (such as the pension credit guarantee credit) would increase sharply; the 
government would have to actively prevent this if it did not want real increases. The 
obvious way to approach reform would be a pre-announced gradual shift – say 2 
percentage points per year – before merging them, to allow time for adjustment. But 
as illustrated above, each adjustment to the tax system would be (perhaps 
surprisingly) complicated, and the whole process could build up resentment and 
tensions over stealth taxes and employers taking advantage. 
The less obvious but more transparent alternative would be to shift all at once, and 
clearly and openly explain what is happening and that all wages (less the part below 
the personal allowance) should go up by the entire amount of employer NICs so as to 
express them in a different metric while leaving real incomes unchanged. This would 
be akin to the process followed for decimalisation or adoption of the euro: certainly 
not trouble-free changeovers – far from it – but not complete disasters to avoid 
repeating at all costs either. 
This discussion so far has been about the possibility of removing employer taxes and 
using only taxes on individuals. But a consequence of the long-run irrelevance of 
formal incidence is that we could equally well move all taxes over to being formally 
employer taxes, rather than employee taxes – abolish Income Tax and employee NICs 
and raise all the revenue through employer NICs. This might help achieve 
transparency through forcing people to recognise the fallacy of formal incidence. 
Nobody could simplistically believe that they were now untaxed and employers were 
‘paying’ virtually all taxes, so it might become natural to think in terms of how wages 
are affected by the rate of tax levied on my employer. This strange-sounding proposal 
actually has considerable advantages. But there are practical disadvantages: transition 
issues that are the mirror-image of those discussed above, and difficulty dealing with 
anyone with significant income other than from their main job – from second jobs, 
savings, etc. 
The problems associated with shifting to an entirely employee-based (or entirely 
employer-based) tax look quite large. Notwithstanding the benefits of a single tax, the 
difficulty in trying to facilitate a one-off rise in earnings without too many knock-on 
effects, combined with the opacity of the required adjustments to employee taxes and 
tax credits, above and beyond the political and presentational difficulties, suggest that 
it may not be worth attempting. Moreover, it is probably too much to expect 
politicians seeking election to argue for the outright replacement of a major tax “on 
businesses” with an equivalent tax “on employees”. One possibility would be to keep 
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an employer tax, but to minimise the cost of administering and complying with it by 
radically simplifying it. For example, it could be a flat rate payroll tax with no 
untaxed band of income for each employee and an earnings base that matched the 
integrated Income Tax-NICs base. Thus the employer would just need to calculate 
their total payroll for the year – on a basis to which they were accustomed – and apply 
a flat rate to it. There would be no need to apportion items such as benefits in kind or 
pension contributions between employees, or worry about employees who worked for 
part of the year or had second jobs. This possibility, along with the possibility of 
keeping employer NICs as it currently stands or abolishing it altogether, is part of the 
context for the discussion of aligning the tax bases in the sections that follow.  
 
C.  THE TAX BASE 
In this section we examine in some detail a few examples of the kind of complexity 
still remaining in the Income Tax and NI systems even after the substantial alignment 
that has taken place over the years. If the two charges are to be merged, further 
alignment of the tax base will be required. Even short of full Income Tax-NI 
integration, differences in the tax base between the two systems at the very least 
provide examples of the potential benefits still remaining from further alignment.  
 
1.  Definition of Earnings 
The Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003 (hereafter ITEPA) levies Income 
Tax on ‘earnings’ from employment (formerly ‘emoluments’ in the old Schedule E 
language that predated the Tax Law Rewrite Project’s work). ‘Earnings’ is broadly 
defined in ITEPA s.62 as (a) any salary, wages or fees, (b) any gratuity or other profit 
or incidental benefit of any kind obtained by the employee if it is money or money’s 
worth, or (c) anything else that constitutes an emolument of the employment. For NI 
purposes, on the other hand, ‘earnings’ is defined as ‘any remuneration or profit 
derived from an employment’.
37 This definition covers both employed earners and 
self-employed earners;
38 although remuneration would seem to relate to employed 
earners and profits to self-employed earners, it is not necessarily limited in this way. 
For example, Tiley & Collison (2007) argue that some benefits-in-kind and expense 
allowances constitute ‘profits’ from employment, and are subject to NICs on that 
basis.
39 In addition, certain statutory payments (sick pay, maternity pay, etc), sickness 
payments, payments for restrictive covenants, and gains arising from shares and share 
options schemes are specifically included in the definition of remuneration for 
contribution purposes. 
Although the definitions of earnings for Income Tax and NI purpose are broadly 
similar, they are not identical.  As noted above, ITEPA taxes earnings ‘from an 
employment’,
40 whilst NIC are charged on gross earnings ‘derived from 
                                                 
37 CITE. 
38 SSCBA 1992, s.3(1).   
39 Tiley & Collison (2007), para 50:01. 
40 ITEPA 2003, ss 7(3)(a) and 9(2) (formerly ICTA 1988, s 19). 
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employment’.
41 Does this (apparently) slight difference in describing the source of the 
earnings give rise to any substantive differences? Whitehouse (2005) argues that until 
recently it was widely accepted that there was no material difference between the 
rules which apply for the purposes of evaluating source in the case of the charge to tax 
under what was, in pre-ITEPA terms, an emolument, on the one hand, and earnings 
for NI, on the other.
42 However, according to Whitehouse, the situation appears to 
have changed following the merger of the Contributions Agency with Inland Revenue 
(now HMRC) in 1999. 
Whitehouse cites two examples to support his contention that ‘the fresh administrative 
mind had some new ideas’. First, in Tullett & Tokyo v Secretary of State for Social 
Security,
43 rather than the customary review of the Schedule E case law, Collins J. 
was urged by Counsel for the Crown not to approach NIC ‘wearing Income Tax 
spectacles’. Secondly, the HMRC NI Manual subtly refers (at para 2010) to the fact 
that ‘earnings’ and ‘emoluments’ are ‘broadly similar’, indicating that in HMRC’s 
view at least some differences must exist. Whitehouse concludes: 
‘It can no longer be assumed that the terms “earnings” and 
“emoluments” … are synonymous. HMRC does now occasionally 
suggest that “derived from” connotes a more remote causal link to the 
employment than “from”. This is no doubt a rather strained 
construction and one where it is difficult to identify a rationale to 
justify its consequences. However, what is more significant is that 
HMRC is perfectly prepared to look again at the longstanding 
assumptions that have been made and to overturn them.’
44
The possibility of increasing divergence between Income Tax and NI on the 
employment earnings base is a worrying development, and runs counter to the history 
of increased alignment of the two charges. We believe that using different definitions 
of earnings subject to Income Tax and NICs creates unnecessary complexity for 
employers, increasing confusion and administrative costs. It also may give rise to 
unexpected results, with some forms of compensation falling within the charge to 
Income Tax or NICs but perhaps not both. 
(a)  Benefits in Kind 
Notwithstanding the (slightly) different definitions of earnings subject to Income Tax 
and NI, it is evident from the discussion above that the types of earnings subject to 
NICs have been steadily moving towards full alignment with the Income Tax 
treatment. One area where this can be clearly seen is the treatment of employee 
benefits. Most taxable benefits are now subject to some form of NICs – Class 1 or in 
most cases Class 1A (and thus subject to employer’s NICs only).
45  Interestingly, 
whether a particular benefit gives rise to Class 1 or Class 1A contributions can depend 
on how the benefit is provided. The HMRC booklet on Class 1A NICs cites the 
                                                 
41 SSCBA 1992, s 3(1). 
42 Whitehouse, M ‘Transfer of Functions’ Tax Journal 30 May 2005, pp.15-16. 
43 [2000] ALL ER (D) 739. 
44 Whitehouse (2005) p 15. 
45 An exceptional example of a taxable benefit not subject to Class 1 NICs and specifically excluded 
from Class 1A NICs is cars provided to disabled employees: see HMRC National Insurance Manual, 
para NIM 14510, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/NIM14510.htm 
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example of private health care – if the employer pays for private health care insurance 
taken out by the employee Class 1 NICs will apply, but if the employer takes out the 
insurance and pays it only Class 1A NICs will be due.
46 Such a difference in NIC 
treatment is difficult to justify on equity and neutrality grounds, and unduly increases 
complexity. 
In any event, most taxable benefits now will give rise to at least some form of NIC 
charge. Similarly, most non-taxable benefits will attract no NIC liability, including 
tax-exempt benefits as well as benefits covered by a PAYE settlement agreement, 
dispensation or an extra-statutory concession.
47 Nevertheless, some differences 
remain, though the logic for drawing the distinctions in the way they have been drawn 
is difficult to fathom. One good example is the treatment of mixed personal and 
business use of employer assets loaned to employees. 
For Income Tax purposes, the employee is regarded as receiving a taxable benefit 
when assets are supplied by his or her employer for personal use without any transfer 
of property in the asset. The taxable benefit is valued at the higher of the annual value 
of the use of the asset (20% of the asset’s market value when first provided by the 
employer) and the annual hire charge paid by the employer (including related 
expenses).
48 This value is also subject to employer Class 1A NICs.
49 In the case of an 
asset (such as a computer) used partly for business purposes and partly privately, 
when the private use is significant the employer must report the whole of the value on 
the P11D annual return of benefits and expenses; the employee can then claim a 
deduction for the business use of the asset under ITEPA s.336.
50 For NICs, however, 
the employer will be subject to Class 1A contributions on the entire value; 
apportionment is not permitted for mixed-use assets.
51
In summary, notwithstanding recent steps towards greater alignment, the current 
treatment of benefits under the Income Tax and NI systems reflects the piecemeal 
way tax and NICs have extended to cover benefits over time. One glance at the long 
and bewildering chart in HRMC payroll deduction guide CWG2 summarising the 
differences in P11D reporting requirements for PAYE and NIC purposes is enough to 
make one wonder what reasons could justify such complexity.
52 The rules could 
benefit from further alignment and clarification. The present differences give rise to 
more favourable treatment for some benefits as compared to others (and also cash 
earnings), in some cases merely because the benefit has been delivered in one way 
rather than another, economically equivalent one. Such treatment is horizontally 
inequitable, economically distortionary, and unnecessarily increases the compliance 
burden on employers (and particularly small employers). 
                                                 
46 HMRC Booklet CWG5, ‘Class 1A National Insurance contributions on benefits in kind: A guide for 
employers’ (2006) para 11, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg5.pdf. 
47 HMRC Booklet CWG5, ‘Class 1A National Insurance contributions on benefits in kind: A guide for 
employers’ (2006) para 7, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg5.pdf. 
48 ITEPA 2003, s 205. 
49 SSCBA 1992, s 10(1)(a).  
50 See Redston (2006). 
51 Ibid, citing SSCBA 1992, s 10(7A) and HMRC Booklet CWG5, ‘Class 1A National Insurance 
contributions on benefits in kind: A guide for employers’ (2005) para 13, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg5.pdf. 
52 HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) pp 80-84, available 
online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
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(b)  Gratuities 
Another form of earnings for which the Income Tax and NICs bases clearly diverge is 
gratuities. Gratuities are specifically included in the definition of earnings subject to 
Income Tax: ITEPA s.62(2)(b). PAYE is applicable where the employer (or an 
employee) operates an arrangement for sharing gratuities among employees; if cash 
tips are paid directly to employees by customers PAYE is not applicable, and the 
gratuity is taxable directly on the employee (though there is some question as to the 
extent to which such tax is actually paid in practice).
53 Further, the cases have 
determined that the mere fact the donor of gift is not the employer does not prevent 
the gift from being an emolument and taxable on that basis.
54 Thus, a standard tip to a 
waitress or cab driver would be subject to tax. However, a voluntary payment made in 
circumstances which show that it is given to the employee by reason of his or her 
personal qualities or attainments (e.g., a benefit match for a retiring professional 
cricketer) may escape Income Tax.
55 Non-cash gifts from third parties up to £250 per 
annum per donor are now specifically exempt from Income Tax if certain conditions 
are met, including that the gift is not made in recognition of particular services 
performed (or to be performed) by the employee in the course of employment.
56
In contrast, ‘gratuities and offerings’ are specifically exempted from NICs under the 
Contributions Regulations so long as one of two conditions is met – either (i) the 
payment is not made directly or indirectly by the employer and does not represent 
sums previously paid to the employer, or (ii) the employer does not allocate the 
payment, directly or indirectly, to the earner.
57 In Channel 5 TV Group Ltd v 
Moreheard,
58 the Special Commissioners held that ‘gratuity’ for this purpose meant ‘a 
voluntary payment given in return for services rendered where the amount of the 
payment depended on the donor and where there was no obligation on the part of the 
donor to make the payment’. For many employees, the NICs treatment of gratuities 
will be much more generous than the Income Tax treatment. Most notably, a standard 
tip paid by a customer directly to a taxi driver or waitress that is subject to Income 
Tax (though not PAYE) will not be subject to NICs at all. If instead a non-
discretionary service charge is automatically included in the customer’s bill and then 
distributed to the employees by the employer, the amounts so distributed are subject 
to both PAYE and NICs.
59
HMRC recently reversed its position on the NIC treatment of gratuities distributed 
through troncs in the catering and services industries.
60 Troncs are special 
arrangements used to pool and distribute tips usually run by one of the employees 
(referred to as a troncmaster) independently of the employer’s influence. For Income 
Tax purposes, troncmasters are required to deduct PAYE. Until recently, HMRC had 
taken a broad view of what constituted an allocation by the employer for NIC 
                                                 
53 HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) p.32, available 
online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
54 See e.g. Calvert v Wainwright [1947] All ER 282.  
55 Moorhouse v Dooland [1955] Ch 284. 
56 ITEPA 2003, s.324. 
57 Social Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1004, Sch 3, Part X, para 5. 
58 [2003] STC (SCD) 327. 
59 HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) p.32-33, available 
online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
60 See HMRC guidance at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/employers/tips-gratuities.htm. 
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purposes.
61 For example, if management influenced the appointment or imposed a 
troncmaster, HMRC considered that to be interference with the running of the tronc 
and the NIC exemption was lost.
62 Furthermore, the February 2005 version of HMRC 
booklet E24 advised that where payments of gratuities form part of contractual pay or 
are used to meet obligations under national minimum wage legislation, they are liable 
for NICs even if they are allocated to employees by a tronc run independently of the 
employer.
63 However, in the face of strong opposition from employees and employers 
in the catering and service sectors, and apparently after receiving further legal advice, 
HMRC recently decided to back down and will no longer be seeking NICs on such 
tronc-administered gratuities.
64 HMRC is revising its guidance in booklet E24 and 
other publications accordingly. 
HMRC’s new position means that an even greater proportion of gratuities will be 
subject to Income Tax but not NICs. As was the case with taxable benefits, on 
neutrality and horizontal equity grounds this difference in treatment for gratuities 
under Income Tax and NI is difficult to justify. In industries such as catering and 
hospitality tips may constitute a significant portion of a worker’s total remuneration. 
Why should those earnings be free from NICs while the typical cash earnings of other 
employees are not? 
(c)  Deductible expenses 
While it is notoriously difficult for employees to claim deductions from their earnings 
for Income Tax purposes, some specific statutory deductions are nevertheless 
available, most notably travelling expenses, but also fixed allowances and 
professional memberships. Claims for other employment expenses may be made so 
long as the expenses satisfy the strict general deductibility test in ITEPA s.336.  In 
order to be deductible under s.336, the expense must be ‘wholly, exclusively and 
necessarily’ incurred in the performance of the duties of employment. 
Turning to NI, in many cases reimbursements paid to employees in relation to 
employment expenses will be disregarded from liability for Class 1 NICs. These 
expenses include professional membership fees. In addition to the particular 
exclusions for different types of expenses and allowances paragraph 9 of Part VIII of 
Schedule 3 provides for the exclusion of ‘any specific and distinct payment of, or 
contribution towards, expenses which an employed earner actually incurs in carrying 
out his employment.’
65 However, as with mixed-use employee benefits, employer 
payments for items which have both a private and a business element are problematic 
for NICs.
66 In addition, no relief against NICs is available for employment-related 
expenses incurred by the employee but not reimbursed by the employer: there is 
                                                 
61 Whiting (2005). 
62 Ibid. 
63 HMRC Booklet E24, ‘Tips, Gratuities, Service Charges and Troncs’ (2005) available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/helpsheets/e24.pdf. 
64 Harry Wallop, ‘Taxman admits defeat on tips’ Daily Telegraph 20 October 2006. 
65 Paragraph 9 of Part VIII of Schedule 3 to the Social Security (Contributions) Regulations 2001, SI 
2001/1004. See also HMRC National Insurance Manual, para NIM05000, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/nim05000.htm. 
66 HMRC NIM05010, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/NIM05010.htm. 
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simply no mechanism for such expenses to be picked up in the non-cumulative, pay 
period structure of NI. 
If expenses, such as travelling expenses and professional memberships, are deductible 
for Income Tax purposes even when not reimbursed by the employer, the question 
becomes whether such reliefs should be available in computing NIC liability. A good 
example of the inequity in NIC treatment as compared to tax treatment is in relation to 
entertainers’ agents’ fees. Those entertainers who are treated as employees for Income 
Tax purposes are allowed a deduction against their employment earnings for fees paid 
to their agents.
67 Such fees can represent a significant expense that entertainers incur 
as part of their earning process.
68 NICs, however, are levied on the gross earnings of 
entertainers, without relief for their agents’ fees. This treatment appears unduly harsh: 
the principle of deducting expenses to calculate taxable income is a sound and widely 
accepted one, and there is no obvious reason that it should not apply here. Although 
primary contributions are reduced to 1% on earnings over the UEL, thus mitigating 
the harshness to a certain extent for high-income earners, the employer’s secondary 
contributions will continue to be levied at the usual rate without limit. This could 
represent a very significant liability in the case of highly-paid entertainers. 
(d)  Conclusion 
The obvious conclusion to draw in respect of the different earnings definitions for 
Income Tax and NI is that alignment here should be pursued as a priority even if 
integration goes no further, since differences have no obvious rationale and working 
out two different earnings measures unnecessarily increases the burden on employers. 
As noted above, this is an area where substantial alignment has occurred, but much 
more could be done. 
 
2.  Period of Assessment. 
Class 1 NICs are due in each pay period (a week or a month for most employees) on 
earnings in that pay period. Each pay period is assessed individually and without 
regard to the previous earnings record of the employee. The rules governing earnings 
periods for NIC purposes are complicated.
69 Liability to Income Tax, on the other 
hand, is measured by reference to income over the tax year running from 6 April to 5 
April. An individual is not liable to Income Tax unless his or her total income for the 
year exceeds his or her allowances. For employees, Income Tax is deducted under 
PAYE on a cumulative basis according to the employee’s PAYE code. Tax deducted 
in each pay period takes account of earnings and allowances that have accrued from 
the start of the year. Unless otherwise notified, banks deduct basic rate tax from 
interest income. If the system works properly, for taxpayers with relatively simple 
affairs the correct amount of tax is withheld from the employee’s earnings without the 
need to file a tax return. 
                                                 
67 ITEPA 2003, ss 328, 329, 352. 
68 See, for example, the ‘Richard and Judy’ case Madeley and another v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2006] STC (SCD) 513. 
69 See the extensive HMRC guidance on earnings periods in the National Insurance Manual, para 
NIM08000, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/nim08000.htm. 
  32 
NIC liability arises when earnings are paid; Income Tax is levied on an earned rather 
than paid basis. This distinction is particularly noticeable with respect to the treatment 
of expense reimbursements. For Income Tax purposes, expenses are reported on an 
annual return; however, for NICs purposes any liability which may arise with respect 
to expense payments does so at the time the employer pays the expenses.
70
Integrating Income Tax and NI would entail moving over to an entirely annual or 
entirely pay-period period of assessment. Specifically, there are three models for how 
a merged charge might operate: 
(i) an entirely pay-period basis for assessment, with liability determined only by 
income within the pay period and exact deduction in the pay period. This is how NICs 
currently operates. 
(ii) an annual basis for assessment with exact cumulative deduction at source. This is 
how Income Tax currently operates. 
(iii) an annual basis for assessment with approximate deduction at source on a period-
by-period basis and a year-end reconciliation for all taxpayers to ensure the correct 
amount is ultimately paid for the year as a whole. This is how income tax currently 
operates in most other countries. 
We believe that the first of these is the least satisfactory whether judged in terms of 
fairness, economic efficiency or practicality. Short assessment periods mean that tax 
liabilities are crucially affected by the timing as well as the level of an individual’s 
income, which seems both unfair and distortionary. To see this, note that the current 
NICs system rewards people whose earnings are bunched into a few pay periods to 
take advantage of the UEL, but also those who earn up to the earnings threshold in 
every period. For example, an employer with gross earnings of £15,000 in a year, 
would pay least NICs if he or she earned exactly £100 in each of 51 weeks and the 
remaining £9,900 in the 52
nd week. This admittedly extreme arrangement incurs a 
total annual employee NICs liability of £155 for an employee contracted in, compared 
with £1,076 if the employee earned £288.46 in every week, a saving of £920 per year 
(the employer NICs liability is £1,254 in either case). It seems grossly unfair that two 
individuals with the same annual earnings should face such different liabilities simply 
because one person’s earnings are bunched and the other’s are smoothed over the 
year. Such substantial differences in liabilities could also lead to distortions in 
people’s behaviour. There may be some distortion to work patterns – not necessarily 
individuals choosing between the two in this calculating fashion, but among people on 
the margin of whether to accept a particular job, one person may be tempted to take a 
job with volatile earnings (rather than stay at home or continue looking) while another 
refuses a job with steady pay. A student might decide not take a summer job because 
the NICs deducted from pay make it not financially worthwhile, whereas if NICs were 
assessed on an annual basis then the earnings might fall below the earnings threshold 
and the job be worthwhile. Perhaps more importantly in practice, this idea might be 
widely exploited by the use of ‘Christmas bonus’ schemes in preference to regular 
pay: a simple tax avoidance scheme which is clearly undesirable for the government 
                                                 
70 See HMRC National Insurance Manual, para NIM05600, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/nimmanual/nim05600.htm. 
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and which the employer and employee may prefer not to have to bother with as well. 
The ease with which a self-employed person could distort the timing of reported 
income (and expenses) in search of NIC savings is perhaps one reason why Class 4 
NICs, unlike Class 1, operate on an annual basis. 
It might be thought that these disadvantages of a short assessment period are 
counterbalanced by a practical advantage: that if liabilities are fully determined within 
each pay period, there is no need for either a cumulative calculation each period or an 
end-of-year assessment, and there is no need for co-ordination between two 
employers and HMRC (via P45 and P46 forms) when an employee moves jobs within 
a tax year.  When looking at NICs, this may be true, though there are arguments in the 
other direction (for example, errors that occur in a pay period can be corrected later on 
relatively easily under cumulation or end-of-year reconciliation, but are much harder 
to correct in a system like NICs that is set up to be precise within a particular period). 
But pay-period assessment can work relatively well for NICs only because NICs are 
calculated only on earnings from a single employment, which is relatively simple to 
deal with. The difficulty of monitoring the timing of self-employment income has 
already been mentioned, and it might be difficult to tax savings and investment 
income other than on an annual basis. Perhaps even more importantly, sub-annual 
assessment looks extremely difficult when incomes from more than one source – two 
jobs, say, or employment and savings income – need to be added together and a 
progressive schedule applied (perhaps one reason why NICs combines pay-period 
assessment with largely per-job rather than per-person liability). It is simply not 
realistic to expect to co-ordinate income from multiple sources on a week-to-week or 
month-to-month basis in order to deduct the right amount of tax in each period. 
Thus considerations of principle and practice both point towards an annual assessment 
period for an integrated charge. This leaves open the question of whether an annually 
based tax should be operated as a cumulative system, like the present Income Tax, or 
by pay period deductions (like NICs) but with a year-end reconciliation to identify 
and resolve any under- or over-payments of tax for the year as a whole. On the one 
hand, cumulative deduction means most taxpayers pay the right amount of tax without 
requiring any effort at all on their part; on the other hand, PAYE is more work for 
employers, works perfectly for ever fewer people as economic activity becomes more 
complicated, and some argue that it is healthy for democracy that citizens to fill in (or 
at least sign off) a tax return each year. These are well-worn arguments and we see no 
need to try to resolve them here; the key point is that integration would imply NICs 
joining Income Tax as an annually based charge, and the debate over whether PAYE 
should be replaced by universal self-assessment can continue as it has for years. 
Moving NICs to an annual basis would be progressive: as mentioned above, pay-
period-based NICs is unfavourable to low-income people with volatile earnings (since 
a single period above the earnings threshold generates NICs liability even if year-
round earnings are low) and favourable to relatively high-income people with volatile 
earnings (since they might be above the UEL in some periods even if their average 
earnings are below it) 
Moving NICs to an entirely annual basis would also require some relatively minor 
technical changes, such as redefining to benefit contribution conditions, but these 
need pose no major difficulties. HM Treasury (2007b) provides a detailed analysis of 
one model for making NICs annual, and concludes that the cost savings would not be 
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large enough to justify the transitional costs. However, it is important to note that the 
Treasury report looks only administration and compliance costs – ignoring the equity 
and economic efficiency issues raised above and the potential gains in terms of 
transparency – and it looks only at the single reform in isolation, rather than as part of 
a broader integration. The benefits of moving NICs to an annual basis may indeed be 
much less if it remains a separate tax with a different earnings definition, different 
reporting requirements, the full contributory system, and so on, than if it is merged 
with Income Tax altogether. 
 
3.  Unit of Assessment: the Person or the Job? 
Income Tax depends on an individual’s total earnings from all employments. If an 
individual has more than one job, the tax deducted by second and subsequent 
employers is adjusted so that the correct amount of tax is taken in total (though this 
process often goes wrong in practice). By contrast, NICs is largely assessed separately 
for each employment. The amount of NICs an employer deducts does not normally 
take into account any other jobs the employee may have. Consequently, individuals 
benefit from an additional tax-free earnings band (the Earnings Threshold) for each 
job they have, though the situation with the UEL is more complicated and outlined 
below. 
This may have important ramifications for employees with multiple employments, 
such as entertainers. As discussed in the following section, entertainers are generally 
classified as employees under the NI Categorisation Regulations, even in situations 
where the entertainer undertakes a series of unrelated, possibly short-term 
engagements. Each engagement constitutes a separate employment for NI purposes, 
which may require the entertainer to pay more than the annual maximum (discussed 
further below). One exception is where the employer carries on business in 
association with another employer(s); in such a case the employer must add together 
the earnings from each job and work out NICs on the total, unless it is ‘not reasonably 
practicable’ to do so.
71  
Employees with more than one employment who expect to earn in excess of the UEL 
in at least one of their employments can apply to HMRC for permission to ‘defer’ 
some of their contributions liability. The term ‘defer’ is a misnomer as permission 
results in exemption from payment, not mere deferral. Where permission is granted, 
the employee pays a reduced Class 1 primary rate of 1% on all earnings from the ET 
to the UEL and the additional employee rate of 1% on all earnings above the UEL in 
the deferred employment(s).
72 In effect, therefore, for such employees the UEL acts as 
a limit on the amount of total earnings that are subject to the main rate of employee 
NICs, not just as a limit on the amount of earnings in each job. Employers’ 
(secondary) Class 1 contributions are payable at the usual rate. Such relief is not 
                                                 
71 One example of when it might be ‘not reasonably practicable’ to add earnings together would be 
where the employer operates a computerised payroll system which is unable to handle this calculation 
such that the employer would have to manually do it: see HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further 
Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) p. 38, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
72 HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) p. 56, available 
online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
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available, however, where the employee’s total earnings from all employments exceed 
the UEL but the UEL is not exceeded in any one employment. As a result, an 
employee with more than one unassociated employment can end up triggering a 
liability greater than that for an employee earning the same amount of earnings but 
from just one employment. 
In principle, per-person assessment seems preferable to per-job assessment. For both 
fairness and economic efficiency reasons, the tax system should be neutral as to 
whether someone earns a given amount through one job or two. Generally speaking, 
NICs currently favours multiple jobs, as employees get one earnings threshold per job 
but a UEL for earnings across all jobs (with the exception mentioned above where 
someone has multiple jobs, individually below the UEL but collectively above the 
UEL – in that case the person could be better off in a single job with the same total 
earnings). On the other hand, per-job assessment is easier for employers to administer. 
Employers do not need to be concerned with what else their employees are doing, and 
employers do not need to interact with other employers and/or HMRC in order to 
calculate and deduct the right amount of tax. 
The choice between per-person and per-job is one area where the distinction between 
employer and employee NICs really matters. If there were a single secondary earnings 
threshold across all jobs for an individual, how should it be allocated between 
employers? For employee taxes, it makes little difference which is treated as the 
‘main’ job: the cost to each employer is the same, and the overall earnings and tax of 
each individual is the same. However, with employer taxes, by default the allocation 
of the earnings threshold affects the cost to the employer. In theory, the allocation of 
the tax-free band could be irrelevant as for employee taxes, but that would require 
earnings in each job to adjust according to how the earnings threshold was allocated. 
In effect, this would mean pay being overtly negotiated in terms of earnings-plus-
employer-NICs.In practice it seems unrealistic to expect the earnings offered with a 
particular job to depend on whether it would be the worker’s principal employment as 
far as HMRC was concerned. If an employer tax is to operate on a per-person basis, 
therefore, the mechanism chosen for allocating the earnings threshold across 
employers – for example, allocating it to the job with the highest pay, or 
proportionately to earnings across the individual’s jobs – would matter. As well as 
inevitably giving rise to administrative complexities, any such mechanism would give 
employers a direct financial interest in reducing what their employees earned in other 
jobs, which seems undesirable. If an employer tax is to be retained, this strengthens 
the case for continuing to levy it on a per-job basis. 
 
4.  Self-Employment 
(i)  Who is Self-employed? Categorisation Issues 
Income from an office or employment is subject to tax under ITEPA
73, whilst self-
employed earnings are taxed under ITTOIA
74. In the vast majority of cases, 
categorising a worker as either an employee or as self-employed for Income Tax 
                                                 
73 Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, s.1 
74 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, Part 2. 
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purposes is not difficult. There are fundamental differences in the activities of a sole 
trader who owns and manages a corner shop, on the one hand, and an employee who 
works 35 hours a week in a large supermarket for an hourly wage. These fundamental 
differences might also be thought to justify different tax treatment (e.g. a wider scope 
for claiming deductions for the self-employed, withholding of tax at source for the 
employed). Nevertheless, there are some workers who will fall somewhere in the 
middle of the spectrum, in a grey area between those who are clearly employed and 
those who are clearly self-employed. Changing work patterns, developments in 
technology and communications, the rise in importance of the service sector, the 
increasing numbers of skilled and mobile professionals and other factors have 
expanded this grey area in recent times.
75  For many more workers than before, 
categorisation as either employee or self-employed for tax purposes has become a 
much more difficult exercise. Nevertheless, such categorisation must be done. 
ITEPA s.4 states that employment includes in particular ‘any employment under a 
contract of service’. In seeking to determine whether a contract of service (as opposed 
to a contract for services) exists in a particular case, the courts have developed a 
number of tests,
76 including the control, integration, economic reality and mutuality of 
obligations tests.
77 Although the common law tests for employment are well-known, 
their application does not provide a clear answer in all cases. HMRC provides some 
guidance on the application of the common law tests in its Employment Income 
Manual
78 and booklet IR 56
79, though this guidance has been criticised for minimising 
the importance of cases in which taxpayers have been found to be self-employed.
80 
ITEPA also deems certain categories of agency workers to be employees.
81
Recently, HMRC introduced an online software tool – the Employment Status 
Indicator – to assist businesses in determining whether a worker is an employee or 
self-employed for tax purposes. The ESI asks a series of questions about the worker’s 
duties and working conditions. Based on the answers received, the ESI provides an 
indication of employment status, along with a reference number. This indication is not 
a definitive or legally-binding opinion, though the determination generally is binding 
on HMRC staff provided the questions have been correctly answered.
82 As some 
judgment is required in formulating answers, this caveat would seem to leave HMRC 
enough scope in practice for refusing to be bound by a particular ESI determination. 
HMRC intends that in the near future an enhanced version of the ESI will be able to 
give a legally binding decision.
83
Categorisation issues also arise under the NI system, which distinguishes ‘employed 
earners’ from ‘self-employed earners’. The vast majority of workers who are treated 
                                                 
75 For a more detailed discussion on this point see Freedman (2001). 
76 See, e.g., Davies v Braithwaite (1932) 18 TC 198, Fall v Hitchen [1973] STC 66, Hall v Lorimer 
[1994] STC 23.  
77 For a more detailed discussion see Tiley Revenue Law (5
th ed) ch 13 and Freedman (2001) ch 3. 
78 HMRC Employment Income Manual, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/eimanual/index.htm 
79 HMRC Leaflet IR 56, ‘Employed or Self-Employed?’ (2004) available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pdfs/ir56.pdf. 
80 Tiley & Collison (2007) para 7:11. 
81 ITEPA 2003, ss 44-47. 
82 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/calcs/esi.htm. 
83 HMRC Operational Impact Assessment for Employment Status Indicator, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/oia/oia-esi.pdf. 
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as employees for Income Tax purposes are also classified as employed earners for NI 
purposes under the same common law tests; however, some important differences do 
exist. Under the NI rules, an ‘employed earner’ is anyone who is gainfully employed 
in Great Britain under a contract of service or in an office with emoluments 
chargeable to Income Tax as general earnings.
84 In addition, the Treasury is 
authorised to introduce regulations treating persons in certain difficult-to-classify 
occupations as employed or self-employed earners (or even non-earners) for NI 
purposes, whether or not they would be so classified under the common law tests on 
their particular facts, and irrespective of their treatment under the Income Tax.
85 For 
example, under the Categorisation Regulations,
86 examiners, moderators, and 
invigilators are classified as self-employed so long as their work is to be performed in 
less than 12 months.
87 Employments of spouses and close relatives, and employments 
as a returning officer, counting officer, member of a visiting force, international 
headquarters or defence organisation are regarded as non-earner’s employment and 
disregarded for contribution purposes.
88  
 More commonly, the NI Categorisation Regulations deem the relevant workers to be 
employed earners for NI purposes, and provide rules for determining the secondary 
contributor. In some cases this treatment may accord with Income Tax treatment. For 
example, most agency workers are deemed employed earners under rules similar to 
those found in ITEPA.
89 In other cases, the NI categorisation may well differ from the 
Income Tax one. Examples of occupations with prescribed treatment under the NI 
Categorisation Regulations include entertainers, construction workers, ministers of 
religion, part-time or visiting lecturers/teachers/instructors (as mentioned above), and 
office cleaners.
90 The Income Tax and NI treatment of some of these problematic 
occupations, particularly entertainers, are discussed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.  
Entertainers 
Actors, musicians and other entertainers have frequently posed difficult categorisation 
problems for both the Income Tax and NI systems. Several of the leading Income Tax 
cases on whether a taxpayer is an employee or self-employed involve entertainers, 
including Davies v Braithwaite (actress) and Fall v Hitchen (ballet dancer). In Davies 
v Braithwaite, the court viewed the totality of the professional engagements entered 
into by the actress Lilian Braithwaite in arriving at the conclusion that earnings from a 
performance in New York were taxable under Schedule D, Case II. The court held 
that the New York performance was merely one engagement in her profession as 
actress. In contrast, the court in Fall v Hitchen focused on the terms of the particular 
engagement at issue in holding that the taxpayer, a ballet dancer employed by Sadler’s 
Wells under a standard Esher contract, was taxable under Schedule E. 
                                                 
84 SSCBA 1992, s 2(1)(a). 
85 SSCBA 1992, s 2(2)(b). 
86 Social Security (Categorisation of Earners) Regulations 1978, SI 1978/1689, hereinafter the 
‘Categorisation Regulations’. 
87 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Part I, para 4. 
88 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Part III, para 7-13. 
89 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Par I, para 2, Col (A). 
90 Additional guidance on the tax and NI categorisation of problematic occupations can be found in the 
HMRC Employment Status Manual at section ESM4000 onwards, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/esmmanual/ESM4000.htm. 
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For a time HMRC took the position (relying on Fall v Hitchen) that most entertainers, 
and especially those working under industry standard Equity contracts, were to be 
treated as employees for Income Tax purposes.
91 However, HMRC has since relaxed 
this position and is now more likely to accept that an entertainer is self-employed.
92 
HMRC will consider employment status to be more appropriate in circumstances 
where an artist is engaged for a regular salary to perform in a series of different 
productions over a period of time in such roles as may be from time to time stipulated 
by the engager, with a minimum period of notice before termination of the contract, as 
would be the case for permanent members of some orchestras and permanent 
members of an opera, ballet or theatre company.
93 In any event, performers who had 
been dealt with under ICTA Schedule D prior to 6 April 1987 can continue to be 
taxed on that basis, if not by law then by concession.
94
While the common law tests determine an entertainer’s employment status as 
employed or (increasingly more likely) self-employed for Income Tax purposes, the 
Categorisation Regulations generally govern the entertainer’s status under the present 
NI regime. Prior to 15 July 1998, the Department of Social Security, which at that 
time administered the NI system, took the view that actors and musicians were nearly 
always employees for NI purposes, relying on the degree of control over the 
performer typically found in the relevant contracts (particularly the standard union 
contracts) and because those contracts required personal service to be performed.
95 
Consequently, the DSS expected the producer of the performance to deduct and remit 
Class 1 NICs, irrespective of the Income Tax treatment, except where it was a clear 
cut case of Schedule D status. However, some entertainers were accepted as self-
employed for both tax and NI purposes, e.g., freelance orchestra workers. 
This position changed in July 1998, when the DSS admitted that its general position 
towards entertainers was unsustainable in law.
96 The Categorisation Regulations 
subsequently introduced between July 1988 and April 2003 ensured that most 
entertainers would be treated as if they were employees for NI purposes (again 
irrespective of their status for Income Tax purposes as determined under the usual 
case law). Under the present NI regime, the Categorisation Regulations apply, and 
Class 1 NICs are payable, unless the entertainer’s remuneration does not involve any 
amount of ‘salary’.
97 At first, the Categorisation Regulations applied only where the 
remuneration was ‘wholly or mainly’ salary, but the test was extended to any amount 
of salary in 2003 once HMRC discovered that most entertainers entered into contracts 
providing for residuals and royalty payments which often exceeded the basic salary 
element.
98 ‘Salary’ is defined in the regulations as payments made for services 
rendered under a contract for services where there is more than one payment, payable 
                                                 
91 Freedman (2001), para 4:58. 
92 ESM4121, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/esmmanual/ESM4121.htm. HMRC 
relies in part on an unreported ruling of the Special Commissioners that live theatre work performed by 
the actors Sam West and Alec McCowan was taxable under ICTA Schedule D and not Schedule E. 
93 ESM4121, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/esmmanual/ESM4121.htm. 
94 Extra statutory concession A75. See also ESM4122, available online at 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/esmmanual/ESM4122.htm. 
95 Tolley’s Practical NIC Service , Lexis Nexis Tolley (October 2006) para 34.2. 
96 Press Release 98/202, dated 15 July 1998. 
97 Social Security (Categorisation of Earners) (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/736. See the 
discussion of the impact of the 2003 regulations in Inland Revenue Tax Bulletin 65. 
98 Inland Revenue Tax Bulletin 65. See also ‘Revenue News: Chaotic concerto’ Taxation 17 November 
2005, p.171. 
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at a specific period or interval, and computed by reference to the amount of time for 
which work has been performed.
99 If the Categorisation Regulations apply, all 
payments under an engagement (including residuals and royalties) are subject to NIC, 
not merely the salary element. 
The advantage for entertainers from making Class 1 NICs is that they can qualify for 
contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance when they are between engagements (which 
would not be case if they were instead making Class 2 and Class 4 self-employed 
contributions). Indeed, the rules in question were reportedly changed in 1998 at the 
request of the actor’s union Equity in order to enable non-working actors to claim the 
allowance.
100 However, this change created a trap for some employers. Recently, it 
was reported that several UK orchestras faced bankruptcy over HMRC claims for 
backdated NICs arising from a failure on the part of the orchestras to properly 
appreciate and respond to the 1998 changes.
101 Since 1998, the orchestras had failed 
to deduct and remit Class 1 NICs in respect of their freelance musicians who were 
treated as self-employed for Income Tax purposes but met the tests for employed 
earners under the NI Categorisation Regulations. Interestingly, the union representing 
the orchestra workers said that it had never lobbied for the right of its members to be 
able to claim jobseeker’s allowance because apparently musicians, unlike actors, are 
rarely unemployed.
102
Other Special Cases 
Labour-only contractors, especially those in the construction industry, are another 
group of workers who have posed a categorisation challenge for Income Tax and NI. 
As with entertainers, the two systems do not always treat such persons in an identical 
fashion. Moreover, a number of additional special categorisation rules apply for NI 
but not for Income Tax.
103 Ministers of religion who are not otherwise employed 
earners are treated as such for NI unless the minister’s remuneration (excluding 
benefits in kind such as free living accommodation) does not consist wholly or mainly 
of salary.
104 This test is similar to the one formerly applied to entertainers. Office and 
other non-domestic cleaners are deemed to be employed earners,
105 as are cleaners of 
telephone kiosks. Part-time or visiting lecturers/teachers/instructors
106 not otherwise 
found to be employed earners are also generally treated as employed earners under the 
Categorisation Regulations.  ITEPA has no equivalent legislative deeming provisions 
for these special cases, with the result that status for Income Tax and NI can differ. 
Conversely, a special Income Tax provision treats employees who are deep sea divers 
as self-employed for Income Tax purposes, but not for NI,
107 putting them in a 
situation similar to that enjoyed by entertainers. Temporary, casual or freelance 
                                                 
99 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, para 5A inserted by Social Security (Categorisation of Earners) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/736. 
100 ‘Revenue News: Chaotic concerto’ Taxation 17 November 2005, p.171. 
101 ‘Britain's orchestras face bankruptcy over £33m national insurance debt’ The Independent 31 
October 2005.  
102 ‘Revenue News: Chaotic concerto’ Taxation 17 November 2005, p.171. 
103 HMRC leaflet CA26 ‘National Insurance contributions for examiners, moderators and invigilators, 
lecturers, teachers and instructors’. 
104 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Part I, para 5. 
105 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Part I, para 1. 
106 Categorisation Regulations, Sch 1, Part I, para 4. 
107 ITTOIA 2005, s.15 (formerly ICTA 1988, s.314). See also HMRC leaflet IR 56, noting the Income 
Tax-NI difference. 
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workers in a specified grade in the film or television industry are also eligible for self-
employment treatment for Income Tax but not for NI.
108
Summary of Categorisation Issues 
The vast majority of workers will be classified in the same way (employed or self-
employed) under both Income Tax and NI. However, as the above examples make 
clear some categorisation differences do exist for a number of occupations. Whether 
an entertainer is an employee or self-employed, for example, is determined for 
Income Tax purposes under the common law tests, but under the Categorisation 
Regulations for NI purposes. This may well result in an entertainer being treated as 
self-employed for Income Tax purposes, but as an employed earner for NI. Freedman 
(2001) notes that at least the non-alignment of tax and NI is express and statutory, 
giving effect to a deliberate policy decision to subsidise frequently unemployed 
performers by allowing them to claim non-means-tested jobseeker’s allowance.
109
However, can the benefits from different treatment for some groups (e.g., 
entertainers) outweigh the costs, particularly in terms of the additional complexity and 
potential confusion, as evidenced by the orchestras’ trap? More importantly, is such 
special treatment equitable? As Freedman (2001) describes it, a particular group 
(actors) with a well-organised, high-profile union has managed to obtain a ‘special 
deal’ for its members, while other groups that might have similar claims to some form 
of hybrid treatment (e.g., homeworkers, possibly) are not being afforded the same 
opportunity.
110 Chartered Institute of Taxation (1998) called for the abolition of the 
Categorisation Regulations on the basis that there was no obvious reason why 
employment status for occupations such as office cleaners, lecturers, and telephone 
sanitisers should not be determined under general principles.
111
(ii)  Differential Treatment of the Self-employed 
For present purposes, the categorisation of employed and self-employed workers only 
matters because the two are treated differently for Income Tax and especially NICs. 
Removing the differences between employees and the self-employed in Income Tax 
and NI treatment could go some way to reducing the significance of the 
employee/self-employed classification problems discussed above. So long as the self-
employed are treated more favourably for Income Tax and NI purposes than 
similarly-situated employees, individuals falling into the grey area on the 
employment/self-employment categorisation continuum will have a strong incentive 
to argue for self-employed status. While we must be wary of determining the position 
of the vast majority for the sake of settling a few hard cases, this raises the more 
fundamental point: can and should differential treatment persist under an integrated 
system, or should an integrated Income Tax-NI system treat employment and self-
employment income the same? 
It is a generally accepted that the Income Tax system treats the self-employed more 
favourably than employees.
112 The different treatment is usually explained in terms of 
                                                 
108 Simon’s Direct Tax Service, para E4.234. See also HMRC leaflet IR-56. 
109 Freedman (2001), para 4:63. 
110 Freedman (2001), para 4.64. 
111 Chartered Institute of Taxation ‘Tax/NICs Harmonisation’ 23 December 1998, p 15. 
112 Freedman and Chamberlain (1997). 
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the harshness of the rules applicable to employees – particularly the immediate 
withholding of tax from earnings under PAYE combined with stricter rules governing 
deductibility of employee expenses – although alternatively it could be argued that the 
treatment of the self-employed is overly generous. 
Furthermore, it is clear that self-employed persons fare better under the NI system 
than employees. Thus, the two systems are consistent in their (favourable) approach to 
the self-employed. But the preferential treatment is much greater for NI than for 
Income Tax. The self-employed pay a Class 4 contribution rate of 8% on their profits, 
plus the low £2.20 per week flat Class 2 charge, compared to the standard Class 1 
primary rate of 12% paid by employees. Moreover, for the self-employed there is no 
equivalent charge to the employer Class 1 secondary contributions.
113
Lower contribution rates for the self-employed have a counterpart in reduced 
entitlement to contributory benefits: as discussed in Section II.A.2, they are not 
entitled to contribution-based jobseeker’s allowance, for example. However, even 
after accounting for this reduced benefit entitlement, the Government estimates that in 
2007–08 the Treasury will take in £1.9 million less in NIC from the self-employed 
than it would have done had the Class 1 primary and secondary contribution system 
applied.
114
Is preferential treatment desirable? The starting point is that, other things being equal,  
it is unfair to treat the self-employed better than employees. Why should individuals 
carrying on essentially the same activity and deriving similar income from it exhibit 
large differences in liability to pay Income Tax just because one does so as self-
employed? The non-neutrality is also inefficient: it distorts the structure of economy, 
leading to people being self-employed who should really be employees. One’s choice 
of activity, and the legal form taken, should be made for commercial rather than tax 
reasons. 
Arguments for justifying more favourable tax treatment of the self-employed 
commonly relate to encouraging entrepreneurship or compensating for high 
compliance costs. However, such arguments do not withstand close scrutiny. 
Reducing compliance costs, where possible, is a laudable goal. However, if 
compliance costs are inherently high for a given form of activity or legal form then it 
should be unappealing and the tax system should not incentivise people to do things 
which involve these wasteful burdens. On entrepreneurship, it is not clear that tax 
breaks for the self-employed are well targeted to encourage activities with significant 
positive spillover effects to the rest of society: ‘entrepreneurial activities’ whose 
spillovers may justify artificial encouragement are more likely to be things like 
investment and innovation, which are better addressed by tools such as capital 
allowances, R&D tax credits and patent protection. If there are no spillovers to self-
employment per se, there is no reason to interfere with the incentives provided by the 
market and artificially encourage entrepreneurship – as with compliance costs, if it is 
unappealing to pursue a certain activity then people should not do so. 
                                                 
113 By way of contrast, in Canada, the self-employed pay Canada Pension Plan contributions on net 
business income at a rate equal to a combined employee and employer rate. 
114 HM Treasury (2007c). 
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There are, however, arguments which might justify favourable treatment of the self-
employed. First and foremost, there is what we could call the ‘dual margin’ problem: 
we need to think not only about people deciding whether to be employees or self-
employed, but also of people deciding whether to be self-employed or incorporated – 
and this is also a decision we would rather not distort. At the moment, the self-
employed are treated more favourably than employees, but less favourably than if 
incorporated. So taxing the self-employed more heavily may ameliorate one problem 
but worsen the other. This dilemma is unavoidable as long as small companies’ profits 
and dividends are taxed less heavily than employees and people are free to choose the 
form in which they operate.  
There may be considerable room to shift exactly where the problem boundary is – 
most simply, by making the treatment of the self-employed more similar to either 
employees or companies, or in a more sophisticated way, by changing the legal 
distinctions (eg creating two categories of ‘self-employed’ which are taxed 
differently, or changing the way ‘small companies’ are defined and taxed). To some 
extent, legal restrictions on the form in which people can choose to operate (such as 
IR35) can help here. But if there is a strong financial incentive to operate in one legal 
form rather than another, there will always be efforts to circumvent these legal 
distinctions and they will always be difficult to police. And it is important to note that 
legal restrictions can only get one so far. At best, they can solve the problem of people 
doing essentially the same job but in a different legal form. However, there is also the 
problem of distorting the underlying behaviour. People decide whether to work for 
someone else, work for themselves or set up a business: even if a system could give 
these various choices careful non-overlapping definitions and police them perfectly, 
the system still should not distort this ‘genuine’ decision. 
A second practical argument for preferential taxation of the self-employed is the 
difficulty threat of evasion. It is much more difficult to verify the income of a self-
employed individual than of an employee, and there is therefore significant potential 
for them to under-report their incomes. Of course, most self-employed individuals 
will honestly declare their incomes whatever tax rate is imposed, and those who are 
dishonest may under-report their incomes even at low tax rates; but to the extent that 
higher tax rates increase the incentive to evade tax, there is a danger that attempting to 
tax the self-employed as heavily as employees might result in increased evasion 
eroding the revenue provided by those who remain honest. 
Finally, the self-employed have a reduced entitlement to contributory benefits, 
although, as noted above, the reduced NICs they pay more than make up for lost 
benefits. Keeping a contributory system might justify at least some reduction in 
taxation of the self-employed if there are good reasons for denying them equal benefit 
entitlement. It should be noted that, unlike with the other two arguments above, lower 
taxation of the self-employed in this case need not be an unavoidable but 
fundamentally unfair and distortionary discrepancy: the expected net benefit of being 
self-employed could be zero. However, there would still be some selection issues – 
people who expected to pay above-average contributions and demand below-average 
benefits would prefer to be self-employed. 
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5.  Savings, investments and state benefits 
NICs are charged only on earned income. Income Tax applies to other forms of 
income as well: to certain state benefits and to income from savings, investments and 
property (though savings held is ISAs are tax-exempt; pensions are discussed in the 
next section). Where investment returns are realised in the form of capital gains rather 
than income, capital gains tax applies (except within ISAs and pension funds), albeit 
at a lower rate than Income Tax and with a large annual exemption and an exemption 
for primary residences. 
Much had been written on whether savings income should be taxed like other income. 
This is most evident in the literature on the merits of a comprehensive income tax 
versus an expenditure tax, and raises issues beyond the scope of this paper.
115 Briefly, 
common intuition is often that income from all sources should be taxed the same, or, 
alternatively, that capital income should be taxed more heavily because savers tend to 
be richer. However, there is a strong argument for not taxing saving where it just 
represents shifting the time at which earnings are spent. According to this argument, 
the untaxed interest rate is the market exchange rate between money today and money 
tomorrow. Further, the tax system should not distort that market, and if a government 
wants to tax rich people more it should do so by (more) progressive taxation of how 
much they earn or spend, not by penalising those who choose to defer their 
consumption. There are also complicated theoretical arguments that suggest that the 
ideal tax rate on savings might be neither zero nor the same as on earnings, but a 
different rate entirely.
116 Finally, it should also be noted that savings invested in the 
corporate sector may face corporation tax, though the effect of interacting personal 
and corporate taxes is extremely complex to trace through, particularly with 
international capital markets where companies may be taxed in one jurisdiction (or 
several) and their shareholders in another. 
But in any case, for present purposes we believe we should not, and need not, reach a 
judgement between taxing savings like earnings or not taxing them at all. Nor should 
we, or need we, restrict governments to these polar options. The history of the UK tax 
system provides ample demonstration of how different rates can be applied to 
earnings and saving: 
•  Current 20% lower  rate, and soon-to-be 10% starting rate, applying to savings 
income only 
•  10% and 32.5% rates on dividends, along with the dividend tax credit system 
•  Composite rate on building society (and later bank) deposits 
•  Investment income surcharge 
•  Earned income relief 
                                                 
115 But see, for example, Institute for Fiscal Studies (1978), Kay and King (1990), Boadway and 
Wildasin (1994) and Auerbach (2006). 
116 See Banks, Diamond and Mirrlees (forthcoming). 
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•  Numerous regimes for taxing capital gains, all of which have treated them 
differently from all other forms of income. 
Integration could thus proceed without needing to change the relative taxation of 
earnings and savings, by, for example, setting a combined basic rate of 31% on 
earnings but continuing to levy 20% at source on interest-bearing deposits. 
The key point is that this form of integration, even if it kept the existing differences 
between the effective tax rates on earnings and savings, would be highly desirable in 
its own right. At the moment the relative taxation of earnings and savings is 
determined opaquely by the combination of Income Tax (rates of which may be 
different for savings income anyway) and NICs, the relative rates of which are 
influenced by many other factors. Integration would make it clear that 31% and 20% 
are the true tax rates, and force the government to defend these rates in open policy 
debate if they think they are the right levels. On this point, it is also relevant whether a 
separate employer tax is retained. This would be just another tax on earnings, so the 
true rate in the example would be higher than 31%, and not as simple as 31% + 12.8% 
either (as discussed above). And, as noted above, there are also other taxes such as 
corporation tax to consider. Integration would not be a panacea, suddently making the 
full nature of tax system visible at a glance; but it would certainly be a step in the 
right direction.  
State benefits raise rather different issues from saving. Taxing benefits merely 
recycles government spending back to the government: a flat 10% tax on a benefit is 
equivalent to reducing the rate of benefit by 10%. The choice between these two 
options, therefore, hinges on the fact that taxes are not flat. A taxable benefit is worth 
less to those with high marginal tax rates than to those with low marginal tax rates. 
Making a benefit bigger but taxable is essentially a way to implement a means test, 
albeit it in quite a restricted way but without needing all the usual machinery of form-
filling and income assessment. In any case, for present purposes this is not terribly 
important. The government should be able to decide whether or not it wants currently 
taxable state benefits to be subject to an integrated charge, and adjust the benefit rate 
up or down accordingly. The basis for this decision would presumably be whether it 
wants the benefit to be subject to the implicit means test.  
 
6.  Pension Contributions and Pension Income 
Income Tax and NICs treat private pensions very differently: 
•  neither is charged on investment returns (interest, dividends and capital gains) 
within pension funds; 
•  pension income is subject to Income Tax but not NICs; and 
•  pension contributions are deductible for Income Tax, but not deductible for 
NICs unless made by employers. 
The approach taken for NICs where pension contributions are made by employees and 
the approach taken for Income Tax are both individually defensible. NICs treats 
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employee pension contributions like any other form of saving: the amount the 
individual chooses to save is irrelevant to assessed earnings, and savings income is 
not subject to NICs. On the other hand, Income Tax treats pensions (whether funded 
by employer or employee contributions) as deferred earnings: the government forgoes 
taxing the remuneration when it is earned, and instead taxes it as earnings when 
withdrawn from the shelter of the fund. It is as if the employer and employee agree 
that, instead of paying the employee when her or she provides his or her services, the 
employer promises to pay a salary several decades later (along with the investment 
returns earned in the mean time). Indeed, in the case of defined benefit occupational 
pensions, which dominated private pension provision until recently, this is almost a 
literal description of what happens. 
The NICs treatment of employer pension contributions is less justifiable. Because 
contributions do not form part of any employee’s assessed earnings when they are 
paid into the fund, and pension income paid out of the fund is not charged to NICs 
either, employer pensions contributions are a form of remuneration that escapes NICs 
altogether. Even when employee benefits in kind were not charged to NICs, this 
treatment seemed hard to justify as pensions were still cash remuneration, albeit 
deferred. Now that the attempt is made to tax almost all forms of remuneration, this 
gaping hole is even more striking. 
Most governments want to incentivise pension saving, and they must provide 
particular incentives to persuade people to save in a form which makes the savings 
virtually inaccessible for most of their working lives (currently until age 50 in the UK, 
rising to 55 in 2010, except in special cases) and then forces them to annuitise their 
accumulated savings (by age 75 in the UK). But the NICs treatment of employer 
pension contributions is not a sensible way to design pension saving incentives. It is 
undesirable for the incentive to be so opaque: anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
people are unaware of this as a major incentive to take remuneration in the form of 
employer pension contributions; it is undesirable for the strength of the incentive for 
pension saving to be determined as an accidental side-effect of current NICs rates; 
and it is undesirable for the incentive to favour employer contributions over employee 
contributions. Some firms already operate ‘salary sacrifice’ schemes, whereby 
employees agree to a reduction in salary in return for the employer’s making pension 
contributions that the employee would otherwise have made, in effect relabelling 
employee pension contributions as employer contributions in order to reduce NICs 
liability. Such schemes can benefit both employee and employer if they share the 
NICs savings, and the fact that such schemes are not more popular is perhaps 
testament to how little understood this NICs break is. If incentives for pension saving 
are to be provided beyond the Income Tax and NICs exemption of returns within the 
fund, such incentives should take a different form. 
The only satisfactory long-term solution, therefore, is for remuneration that is paid 
into pension funds – whether by the employer or the employee – to be subject to each 
of Income Tax, employee NICs and employer NICs (or any integrated replacement) 
once, whether that means it is taxed as income at the point it is paid into the fund or 
taxed as income when it is withdrawn from the fund. At first glance, it might seem 
obvious what should be done – the government should pick whichever of the Income 
Tax treatment and the NICs treatment of employee contributions it prefers, and apply 
that treatment across the board, to both Income Tax and NICs (or an integrated 
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system), and to both employer and employee pension contributions. In practice, 
however, there are several difficulties with any simple route forward. 
Suppose first that the government wished to move entirely to a regime like that 
currently used for NICs on employee pension contributions, so that contributions 
would not be deductible from earnings but pension income would be untaxed. For 
employer pension contributions, this would mean identifying the contribution made in 
respect of each employee and adding it to their taxable earnings so that contributions 
would be taxed at the appropriate rate for each individual, their marginal rate of 
Income Tax-NICs. But in practice this would be very difficult to implement for 
employer contributions to defined benefit pension scheme, because such contributions 
are not made in respect of any particular scheme member. The employer simply 
makes whatever contribution they (and the scheme trustees, on actuarial advice) 
decide is appropriate to meet the scheme’s future liabilities. Instead of trying directly 
to divide the value of contributions between employees, an alternative approach 
would be to try to value the additional pension rights each employee has accrued in 
the relevant period, and subtract any employee contribution to impute the employer 
contribution. This is the approach already used in company accounts, where directors’ 
total remuneration must be reported. However, in practice such valuations are 
extremely difficult and laden with assumptions, and it is not clear what should be 
done when, for example, an employer is contributing to the fund but no new pension 
rights are being accrued. 
Now suppose that the government wished to move entirely to a regime like that used 
for Income Tax, so that contributions would be deducted from earnings but pension 
Income Taxed. If there were no employer tax, this might be feasible. But if some form 
of employer tax were kept, we would have the mirror-image problem to that discussed 
above. Where an employee contributes to a pension, the system would mean giving a 
NICs rebate to the relevant employer; however, an employee contributing to a 
personal pension might have several employers or none, and the government has no 
way of assigning the rebate to a particular employer. Moreover, there is an even 
bigger problem because it would be unfeasible to levy an employer tax at the point 
that pension income is received, for the simple reason that the employer might not 
exist by the time the pension was in payment. (Indeed, if the employer did exist the 
directors might be tempted to liquidate the company and re-form it under a different 
name in order to avoid liability.) 
If the government’s task were only to ensure that appropriate Income Tax and 
employee NICs were levied on measurable cash amounts that employees and their 
employers paid into a pension fund for the individual employee to buy an annuity for 
retirement (a “defined contribution” scheme), they might just make the choice 
between including contributions in taxable earnings and excluding contributions but 
taxing pension income instead. What causes the problems described above is the 
desire to operate an employer tax and to cope with “defined-benefit” pensions. 
Take first the issue of defined-benefit pensions. Consider an employer who rewards 
his employees, not by paying them extra salary, but by promising to pay them, each 
year from retirement age until they die, one per cent of whatever the salary they earn 
in their final year with the firm (a “defined-benefit” pension). Clearly we would wish 
to tax this remuneration, and there are two ways in which we could do so. We could 
tax the IOU when it is earned each year by the worker. But valuing the pension 
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promise is extremely difficult, because it depends on the worker’s expected future 
earnings progression, dates of retirement and death, assumed investment returns, and 
so on. Alternatively, we could forgo taxing the IOU and instead tax the cash payments 
when they are eventually made. This seems much simpler and more satisfactory, and 
it suggests that employer-funded defined benefit pensions should be taxed when paid 
rather than when earned. 
Now suppose that the employer changes his offer slightly: instead of promising to pay 
one hundredth of final salary each year, the employer promises to pay one sixtieth, but 
only on condition that the employee also contributes £1,000 to the fund from which 
her pension will eventually come. Unlike with the employer contribution to the fund, 
the employee contribution could be taxed quite easily: we simply do not deduct the 
£1,000 from the employee’s assessed earnings for the year. But when it comes to 
taxing the pension income, we could not tax the employer-funded part without taxing 
the employee-funded part, since it would be impossible to say how much of the 
pension is attributable to each. So, having decided to tax employer contributions when 
received rather than when earned, we have little choice but to tax employee 
contributions likewise. This leads us to a regime that works like Income Tax does 
now, at least for defined-benefit pensions, and perhaps also (for consistency and 
simplicity) for defined-contribution pensions. 
Now consider the complications that arise if we also wish to levy an employer tax. 
Whether the pension is defined-contribution or defined-benefit, basing an employer 
tax on the amount ultimately paid out to the individual now looks unfeasible, for the 
simple reason that the employer might no longer be in business by then. The nearest 
alternative would be to take the tax out of pension fund or pension income rather than 
tax the employer – in effect, replacing the employer tax with an employee tax, but 
only for earnings deferred until retirement. For defined-contribution pensions, the 
other side of this regime is also a problem. If we were to charge employer NICs on 
pension income, we would also need to deduct pension contributions from the 
earnings on which employer NICs was assessed. However, an employee contributing 
to a personal pension might have several employers or none, and the government has 
no way of assigning the rebate to a particular employer. 
Might it be possible to levy an employer tax on pension contributions rather than 
pension income, even while deducting contributions and taxing pension income 
instead for employee taxes? For defined contribution pensions, this seems feasible. 
For defined benefit schemes, the difficulty of valuing pension promises still makes 
taxing the remuneration at the time it is earned look unappealing. But it would be 
possible if we were prepared to apply a flat rate to all employees (which in the current 
system means applying the main 12.8% rate to pension contributions even if earnings 
are below the earnings threshold). We would not need to value the pension promises 
made to each employee; we could just charge the flat-rate tax on the total 
contributions made by the employer into the pension fund. 
The various difficulties applying to particular taxes on particular types of contribution 
to particular types of pension scheme are summarised in Table A overleaf. The 
discussion so far seems to point to the following solutions: 
•  If employer NICs were abolished altogether, an integrated system could work 
like Income Tax, with contributions deductible and pension income taxed.  
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Table A: Income Tax and NIC treatment of pension contributions 
 
Defined benefit  Defined contribution   
Employee contribution  Employer contribution  Employee contribution  Employer contribution 
Employee NICs 
and income tax 




Difficult to tax unless 




On contribution  Employer NICs    Difficult to tax unless 




Difficult to relieve: need 
to assign contributions 
to particular employers 
 
Employee NICs 
and income tax 
   
On withdrawal 
Employer NICs  Difficult to tax: employer might not exist  Difficult to tax: employer might not exist 
 
  Currently subject to income tax 
 




•  If an employer tax were retained, either at a flat rate or with a flat rate 
applying to earnings paid into pension funds, the employee tax could work as 
above, while employer tax could be levied on contributions (ie employer 
contributions would be added to assessed earnings and employee contributions 
would not be deducted) but not pension income. There appears to be no fully 
satisfactory solution that allows a tax-free earnings band within employer 
NICs to apply to pension contributions. 
All this, however, has been presented as if setting up a new pension and tax system 
from scratch tomorrow. A massive issue is transition: the gap between an individual’s 
contributions and her pension income can be several decades, and there are huge 
numbers of people (in fact most of the population) who have built up pension rights, 
whose contributions were taxed/exempt under the existing system and were made in 
expectation of a particular regime for taxing the income. 
Consider the second of the bullet-pointed options above. First, levying an employer 
tax on future pension contributions does not prevent employer contributions made so 
far from escaping tax altogether. Second, and perhaps more importantly, existing 
pensioners, and those who have largely built up their pension rights, would 
unexpectedly face a higher rate of tax on their pension income than they had 
previously thought, as the equivalent of employer NICs as well as Income Tax is 
levied on it. This is essentially a windfall tax on pension funds. This does have 
significant advantages – it raises substantial revenue with very little (if any) distortion 
to behaviour – but could reasonably be criticised on a number of grounds: 
•  It is unfair: these people have already paid employee NICs on their 
contributions, now they have to pay it again on the income coming from the 
fund, straightforward double taxation. Had they known this reform would 
happen, they would probably not have saved in this way. 
•  It hurts many middle-income pensioners for whom it is too late to earn or save 
more. 
The final report of this project will consider this transition issue in more detail, but the 
scale of the problem should not be understated. A further difficulty with the problems 
above is the treatment of the self-employed: a system that involved exempting 
pension contributions and taxing pension income would face the difficulty of how to 
tax the pension income of individuals who were formerly self-employed (for some or 
all of their working lives) if we wish to continue taxing the self-employed less heavily 
than employees (see Section IV.C.4 for discussion of this). This problem does not 
arise in the current system because we only apply this mechanism to Income Tax, the 
rates of which are the same for the self-employed as employees, not to NICs.The 
problems addressed in this section are problems with the current system. It is 
important to recognise that the case for integration of Income Tax and NI does not 
rest on this analysis. As with the taxation of savings discussed in the previous section, 
it would be possible to proceed with integration but to keep the current tax treatment 
of pensions, unsatisfactory though it is, largely unchanged. This would involve taxing 
both pension contributions and pension income, but each at a reduced rate: employee 
contributions (but not employer contributions) would be taxed at rates equivalent to 
the current NICs rates, while pension income would be taxed at rates equivalent to the 
current Income Tax rates. This would be more complicated than the alternative 
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systems described above, though not obviously more complicated than the current 
system. And as with the taxation of savings, making transparent the hybrid treatment 
that is implicit in the current system could only help to focus the policy debate. 
 
7.  The Young, the Old and the Married  
 (i)  Young People 
Whatever a person’s earnings, if he or she is under 16 years of age then no Class 1 
(primary or secondary), Class 2, or Class 4 NICs are payable (nor is he or she entitled 
to make the voluntary Class 3 contributions). No such young person’s exemption is 
available for Income Tax, however. One can see the attractiveness of exempting 
young employees on their earnings from paper routes and babysitting, for example, 
but of course those earnings would not attract NICs in any event so long as they were 
below the earnings threshold. The argument for tax breaks on the basis of age alone 
are weak, but were the taxes to be integrated, the Government could decide whether to 
exempt under-16s without any great difficulties either way. 
(ii)  Older People 
Older people get preferential treatment for both NI and Income Tax. Individuals over 
state pension age (65 for men, 60 for women born before 6 April 1950 rising on a 
sliding scale to 65 for women born after 6 April 1955) are not subject to NICs, 
although Class 1 secondary contributions are still payable by employers with respect 
to employees over state pension age, and moreover the employer’s contributions are 
payable at the not-contracted-out rate even if the employer operates a contracted-out 
pension scheme. On the Income Tax side, individuals between the ages of 65 and 74 
are entitled to claim a larger personal allowance of £7,550 and those aged 75 and 
older can claim £7,690. If income exceeds a certain threshold (£20,900 in 2007–08), 
then these higher personal allowances are reduced by 50 pence for every pound of 
income above the threshold, gradually reducing it to a minimum level equal to the 
allowance for the under-65s. 
The merits of preferential treatment of older persons is a thorny issue. Many issues 
are relevant here: debates on pensions adequacy and on age discrimination (e.g. the 
need to encourage employment of older workers), the contributory principle (older 
workers have already ‘paid their bit’), and the interaction with the taxation of savings 
income and especially pensions. The empirical labour supply literature suggests that 
lower tax rates on older workers may be efficient if their working decisions are more 
responsive. We do not attempt to resolve all these issues here. But any of the three 
existing regimes (virtually no recognition for employer NICs, complete exemption for 
employee NICs, higher allowances for Income Tax) could be applied to a merged tax, 
albeit with minor complications in some cases (for example, complete exemption is 
relatively easy to implement for an earnings tax but is more complicated for a merged 
tax that is to be deducted at source from interest income). One could even construct a 
hybrid regime that maintains the effect of the status quo (i.e. with both higher 
allowances and a reduced rate for older workers). 
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(iii)  Married Couples 
NICs has operated largely on an individual basis since its inception, with little in the 
way of special recognition for married couples. The is one notable exception to this is 
the married women’s reduced rate, which allows a reduced rate of 4.85% employee 
NICs on earnings between the PT and the UEL in exchange for lower benefit 
entitlement.
117 However, since May 1977 this option has been available only to 
women who have remained married and working (except for a break of a single tax 
year) since that date, which is now a very small number. 
Income Tax, by contrast, was jointly assessed for married couples for many years: a 
married woman’s income was treated as belonging to her husband for purposes of 
computing his liability to Income Tax.
118  The 1988 Finance Act introduced 
independent taxation of married women with effect from 6 April 1990. Some benefits 
to married taxpayers previously available under the Income Tax system remain, but 
are gradually being phased out: most notably, the married couple’s allowance 
(described in Section II.A.1(a)). And many other Income Tax and Capital Gains Tax 
provisions continue to make reference to the taxpayer’s spouse (and other relations) in 
determining the taxpayer’s liability.
119 Examples include: 
•  absent an election, income from jointly-owned property is deemed to arise in 
equal shares to each spouse,
120 
•  for purposes of determining if a company is controlled by a person, the 
definition of “associate” includes the person’s spouse,
121 
•  spouses while living together may claim only one main residence exemption 
for capital gains tax between them,
122 and 
•  transfers of capital assets between spouses living together generally take place 
at the amount giving rise to no gain/no loss.
123 
With effect from 5 December 2005, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 extended the 
treatment of married couples under Income Tax to include registered same-sex 
couples. Cohabiting couples are not treated as spouses for Income Tax purposes, 
regardless of the length of time they have been cohabitating or whether the couple 
have had children together. 
The main policy provisions for married couples – the married couple’s allowance in 
Income Tax and the married women’s reduced rate in NICs – are gradually 
disappearing. Integration may provide an opportunity to deal them a death blow, but if 
desired they could be retained in a merged system. The other provisions for married 
couples in Income Tax (and Capital Gains Tax) arise because Income Tax, unlike 
                                                 
117 Self-employed women who would be eligible to pay the reduced rate if employed are not obliged to 
pay Class 2 contributions. 
118 Then ICTA 1988, s 279. 
119 See Bowler (2007) for a full discussion. 
120 ICTA 1988, ss. 282A and 282B. 
121 TA 1988, ss. 416 and 417. 
122 TCGA 1992, s. 222. 
123 TCGA 1992, s. 58. 
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NICs, applies to savings: they mostly relate to the need to formulate rules for jointly-
owned property or transfers of assets between spouses. If a merged tax were to apply 
to savings, some such rules would be needed – whether like the current rules or 
different – but this need not pose a significant barrier to integration. 
 
8.  Other Reliefs  
Several other reliefs are available for Income Tax but not NICs (or vice versa): 
examples include blind person’s allowance and relief for charitable giving within 
Income Tax. Applying these reliefs to one charge but not the other is akin to giving 
partial relief (or applying a reduced rate) in a merged tax. The implication is much the 
same as for savings and pensions: integration would provide a good opportunity to 
review whether these reliefs should apply across the board or not at all; but it would 
also be possible – at the cost of some complexity – to give partial relief, equivalent to 
the current system, and allow transparent debate as to whether such a reduced rate is 
really the optimal policy choice. 
 
9.  International Issues  
The regulations governing the applicability of Income Tax and NICs to individuals 
seconded to/from the UK, etc, are determined by a combination of UK law, EU law 
and bilateral treaties, and are somewhat different between Income Tax and NICs. This 
poses potential difficulties for a merged tax. For individuals who would currently be 
liable for one charge but not the other, a dilemma arises: under an integrated system, 
should they be liable for the full tax, no tax, or a special schedule designed to mimic 
being subject to only one of the current taxes? None of these seems very satisfactory. 
It would clearly be preferable to align the rules in the existing system as far as 
possible to eliminate such cases. However, it is not clear how far the UK could pursue 
this unilaterally. The final report of this project will examine these questions in more 
detail. However, it is worth remarking that Australia and New Zealand, neither of 
which has a separate social security tax like NICs, seem to have found satisfactory 
solutions to this problem (albeit not in an EU context), suggesting that it may not be 
insurmountable. 
The second international issue that arises is one already dealt with in Section IV.A: 
the need to find some replacement for contributory conditions, if those are abolished, 
to restrict access to benefits and prevent internationally mobile individuals from 
taking advantage of the UK’s generosity. Once again, Australia and New Zealand 
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D.  PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES 
A good example of how the Income Tax and NI systems operate differently on a 
procedural and administrative level, even many years after the merger of the Inland 
Revenue and Contributions Agency, is the handling of underpayments of tax and 
NICs. For Income Tax, generally the employer has to pay any underpayment of tax 
resulting from a mistake in PAYE deduction. However, a direction can be made for 
the employee to pay an underpayment if HMRC is satisfied that the employer took 
reasonable care and that the underpayment arose from an error made in good faith.
124 
For NICs the general rule is the same as for Income Tax – the employer is responsible 
for any underpayment. However, employers are entitled to recover the underpayment 
from the employee by making extra deductions from future payments to the employee 
in the tax year in which the mistake arose, and (so long as the error was made in good 
faith) the following tax year. The extra amount that can be deducted each payment is 
limited to the normal amount of employee NIC due on the payment.
125 If this limit 
means that the employer is unable to recover the full amount of the underpayment by 
the end of the second tax year then the employer must pay the balance. 
Whitehouse (2005) provides examples of two additional procedural differences 
between NICs and Income Tax. First, since NICs are formally neither a tax nor a duty, 
proceedings for recovery of unpaid NICs are subject to the Limitations Act 1980, 
while collection proceedings for unpaid Income Tax are not.
126 As a result, HMRC 
must either ask taxpayers to sign ‘acknowledgements of debt’ or commence 
protective County Court proceedings with the six-year period, or else risk the NICs 
debt becoming statute barred. There does not appear to be any logical justification for 
treating the collection of NICs and Income Tax debts differently in this respect. 
Second, although Whitehouse notes that the procedure for appealing NICs decisions is 
sensibly aligned with Income Tax appeals, Regulation 7A of the Special 
Commissioners (Jurisdiction and Procedure) Regulations permits the Presiding 
Special Commissioner to deal with appeals by adopting a “lead case” arrangement 
(analogous to a group litigation order in the High Court), and this rule applies only to 
NICs appeals, not to Income Tax). As Whitehouse concludes, it is odd that Regulation 
7A would appear not to allow an appeal raising, for example, a PAYE issue to be 
dealt with under the lead case arrangements that may be in place to deal with NIC 
issues, particularly given that the issues may involve consideration of largely the same 
point. 
                                                 
124 HMRC Booklet CWG2, ‘Employer’s Further Guide to PAYE and NICs’ (2006) p 17, available 
online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/guidance/cwg2.pdf. 
125 Ibid. 
126 The Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings for recovery by the Crown of “tax or duty or 
interest on any tax or duty” (s 37(2)). The fact that NICs are not formally a tax also means that NICs 
are not subject to the normal Finance Bill procedures, so that (for example) National Insurance reforms 
are not subject to the Parliamentary convention preventing the House of Lords voting on financial 
measures.  
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V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has highlighted both the potential benefits from integrating Income Tax 
and National Insurance and the differences that remain between Income Tax and NI 
making integration more difficult. In most cases, these differences do not seem to 
form prohibitive barriers to integration. Indeed, in many cases the existing differences 
could be retained as features of a merged tax: reduced rates of tax on particular forms 
of income, for example, or benefit entitlements based on tax paid on earnings only. 
Keeping many such features would make a merged tax far more complicated, 
however, to the point where the benefits of integration become rather doubtful. Yet in 
many cases integration could facilitate bold policy options that would be welcome in 
their own right as well as allowing for a simpler merged tax. Substantive reform 
would entail significant transition costs, and we postpone to the final report making 
recommendations as to what kind of reform (if any) would justify this upheaval.  
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